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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will examine three potential scenarios for the unification of the Korean 
peninsula and discuss their pros and cons.    
1. The collapse of the DPRK government followed by its absorption into the 
ROK’s current governmental structure.      
2. A possible Free Trade Area (FTA) encompassing the Korean peninsula with 
the potential to expand to neighboring nations.   
3. The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) within the DPRK using 
business practices from both the ROK and the PRC models to strengthen their 
economy and national ties.   
 
A matrix of five variables will be used to measure the effectiveness of each 
scenario including time, cost, stability, international acceptance, building trust between 
the two Korean states.  The scenarios will also be examined through the lens of the theory 
of economic interdependence to understand the importance of economic engagement 
throughout the Korean Peninsula including the economic path of each state.  The 
hypothesized end state would encompass a single Korean nation that actively participates 
in the international community while remaining free of nuclear weapons.  I will dedicate 
a section to understanding how this new nation might emerge on the international scene 
as well as how the neighboring countries view the possibility of a unified Korean nation.  
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I. HISTORY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Why has the Korean peninsula hosted two states since the end of the Second 
World War, and what options are available to create a peninsula united as a single nation?  
I intend to look at various polices that can help to unify the Korean peninsula, merging 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
into a nation under one governmental system.  This thesis will focus on the commonly 
accepted scenario of an internal collapse of the DPRK, as well as two alternative 
scenarios concentrating on the benefits of expanding the DPRK economy through 
increased economic engagement while encompassing the theory of economic 
interdependence.  The economic environment on the peninsula is often overshadowed by 
the vast security concerns but has the potential to develop a strong relationship between 
the two Korean states that can lead towards unification.  The international community 
prefers a unification of the Korean peninsula when the economies of both Korean states 
are stable and growing while moving towards a set of similar goals.  The desired end 
state would meet three milestones:  1. a unified Korean peninsula, 2. a peninsula free of 
nuclear weapons and 3. a nation that actively participates within the international 
community.  This thesis focuses on the following scenarios:    
1)  The first scenario examines the potential of a collapse of the DPRK’s 
government followed by an absorption by the ROK’s current governmental 
structure.  This unification scenario has the potential to cause intense shockwaves 
throughout the international community both economically and politically.  The 
new nation may wish to maintain the nuclear weapon arsenal already present 
within North Korea’s borders but the international community will mostly 
persuade the nation to dismantle its arsenal through diplomatic channels.  The 
long-term end state has the possibility to meet the three requirements stated 
above.  The ROK has shown its resilience towards absorbing external shocks and 
its willingness to accept assistance from the international community throughout 




2) The second scenario focuses on a possible Free Trade Area (FTA) throughout 
the peninsula with the potential to expand and include the nations of the United 
States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia and Japan.  This scenario 
will allow the DPRK to strengthen its economy, while providing its government 
an alternative source of income to the development and sale of weapons, which 
can halt its nuclear weapons program.  The close relationship of the nations 
involved in the FTA can help guide the future of the DPRK and the Korean 
peninsula as a whole.  This scenario has the potential to achieve the goals of 
removing the nuclear weapons from the peninsula and incorporating the DPRK 
into the international community but may not achieve a unified Korean peninsula.         
 
3)  The third scenario deals with the establishment of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) within the DPRK using business practices adopted from the ROK and the 
PRC to strengthen its economy.  This will give the DPRK an alternate source of 
income besides its weapons programs while focusing on the development of state 
institutions.  The main advantage of an SEZ scenario focused toward the ROK 
will be the DPRK’s minimal interaction with the international community.  The 
ROK, along with the zones themselves, will act as a gateway to the global 
community allowing the North Korean society to absorb new ideas through a 
prolonged period.  The nations close interaction has the potential to create an 
atmosphere where trust can be built between the DPRK and the ROK as both 
states benefit from an increase in intra-Korean trade, which can assist in 
transitioning to a single nation.   
I use a metrics to measure each scenario with the following variables:  the amount 
of time each scenario will take to reach a unified nation, the cost of each scenario 
encompassing both the Korean states along with the international community, how each 
scenario will affect regional and world stability, how each scenario will be accepted in 
the international community and the applicability of each scenario to build trust.  I feel 




The time associated with each scenario is an important variable, as a rapid 
unification will call for the international community to provide immediate assistance and 
more importantly, a longer period with the risk of a violent lashing out by the north prior 
to final reunification.  The costs of unifying two independent states has been elevated 
since the removal of the Berlin Wall and the burden carried by the international 
community in regards to the cost associated with uniting East and West Germany.  Many 
scholars believe the cost to unify two nations only surface when dealing with an abrupt 
collapse, however I use the term cost to measure the amount of money needed to level the 
standard of living among the citizens of the new nation.1  The stability of the Korean 
peninsula and the region of Northeast Asia have been inconsistent in the last twenty years 
and needs to be viewed whenever discussing these two states.  Actions by different 
nations on the peninsula have lead many to believe conflict was inevitable, only for a 
temporary peace to emerge after numerous nuclear emergencies and various political 
policies.  The current policy of the DPRK regime to keep the international community 
outside its nation prevents any organization to understand the severity of its problem and 
to effectively plan for future endeavors.  While dealing with the two Korean states, the 
surrounding nations along with the international community must work to create a nation 
acceptable by the world community that removes potential flashpoints and military 
confrontations in the region.  This final variable of trust throughout the peninsula 
continues to be absent in intra-Korean negotiations and keeps the nations from 
formulating and reaching common goals.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
A unified Korean peninsula has been the goal of the Korean people since it fell 
under Japanese control in the late nineteenth century and later become a Japanese colony 
in the early twentieth century.  After the Second World War, the Japanese were removed 
from the Korean peninsula, only to be replaced by two new superpowers.  The Union of 
                                                 
1 Han Aran, “Term ‘reunification cost’ inappropriate,” Korea.net, October 31, 2007, 




Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)2 and the United States of America quickly flexed their 
influence on the devastated peninsula and created two occupational zones.  The northern 
zone fell under the USSR while the southern zone was under the guidance of the United 
States without the input from the Korean people.3  These zones would eventually form 
the current boundary between the DPRK and the ROK along the 38th Parallel.  The two 
superpowers continued to support their respective Korean state throughout the Cold War 
while neither pushed for progress towards unifying the peninsula.  Although Korea was 
not the only nation divided after the Second World War, it remains one of the only 
countries still divided after the end of the Cold War.4   
I examine various policies and institutions that can help to unify the Korean 
peninsula into a nation free of nuclear weapons who actively participates in the 
international community.  Focusing on the three scenarios, I will examine how each 
different path can be implemented to help ease a transition from two fundamentally 
different countries into a cohesive nation.  I will use the economic interdependence 
theory to understand the role of economic engagement can play towards unification.  I 
will conclude with the scenario, which I feel is the most probable that can achieve the 
desired end state. 
C. WHY UNIFICATION MATTERS 
The two Koreas, often-labeled shrimps between two whales, were forced to 
accept the policies of their power neighbors, while a unified Korean peninsula has the 
potential to influence Far East Asian policies.5  Understanding the different scenarios can  
                                                 
2 I use both the terms USSR and Russia to describe the present day Russian Federation.  The term 
USSR is used between the years 1922 and 1991 while the term Russia is used for periods outside of the 
aforementioned time.     
3 Jay Speakman and Chae-Jin Lee, The Prospects for Korean Reunification (Claremont, Calif: Keck 
Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont McKenna College, 1993), 11. 
4  Ibid., 5.  China is the other divided nation with the PRC on the mainland and the ROC located on the 
island of Taiwan.   





help understand the role a unified Korea may take and understand the future of the 
region.  This can aid policy makers with interest in the region about future decisions 
concerning both regional and global policies toward the Korean peninsula. 
The fall of the USSR in early 1990 brought a glimmer of hope for unification, but 
over time only uncovered the differences between the two Korean states.  In 1994, many 
theorists believed the DPRK would collapse following the death of Kim Il-Sung, only to 
witness his son, Kim Jong-Il, take control of the nation and keep the state intact.  Since 
2002, North Korea has experienced numerous failed economic reforms, witnessed a 
continued decline in the health of Kim Jong-Il and the actions of their main ally, China, 
move towards a capitalist economy.  The possibility of a unified Korean peninsula again 
arises after a thaw in the long freeze in intra-Korean affairs.  While much literature is 
available on various possible unification scenarios, one common theme arises:  the 
unification of a Korean peninsula will only occur when the two Korean governments 
reach a mutual understanding and agree on a common set of goals.  Outside nations, no 
matter how influential they once were on the Korean peninsula, cannot force policy 
between the two Korean states that can lead to unification.  Scholars believe a unified 
Korea with one government can “spur a diplomatic revolution in Northeastern Asia” 
increasing both security and economic growth for all regional players.6    
Increased economic activity between the two Korean states can increase the flow 
of information and lead to an increase in intra-Korean trust.  The business sectors holds 
the key to unlock the chains on current communications needed to continue intra-Korean 
negotiations allowing each governmental to gain the confidence of the other, which 
Edward Olsen holds as a key element prior to unification.7  Once economic ties are 
established and stable, the governments can set and reach desirable benchmarks that 
assist in leading to a unified Korean nation.   
 
                                                 
6 Robert Dujarric et al., Korea: Security Pivot in Northeast Asia (Indianapolis, Ind: Washington, DC: 
Hudson Institute; Distributed by the Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 5. 





D. HISTORY OF A UNIFIED AND DIVIDED KOREA 
The history of the Korean peninsula led to many of its modern day policies, 
particularly the DPRK’s distrust of foreign powers.  Examining the history of the 
peninsula can help one to understand the sensitive nature associated throughout the 
peninsula and the importance of working towards an agreement via both Korean states.  
The area of Northeast Asia has a tendency to remember past atrocities committed by 
neighboring countries that has lead to stalled negotiations in the current diplomatic 
forums.  The actions of foreign powers on the Korean peninsula are intrusive and helped 
spur the DPRK’s philosophy of Jueche, which remains an obstacle to unification, as they 
do not readily accept assistance from outside nations without a shared history.      
The first unified Korean nation emerged under the Shilla Kingdom after intense 
warfare broke out on the peninsula.  The new Korean nation possessed a common 
language, internationally recognized borders and ethnic homogeneity that was absent in 
the western world until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.8  The ability of the different 
kingdoms to combine elements of their civilization into a common nation of Korean can 
assist in future unification attempts.  The differences between the ROK and DPRK can 
again be combined to create a strong Korean nation.  The common culture and heritage 
throughout the peninsula must be the foundation utilized to merge the two Korean states 
as a tool to ensure ethnic and religious conflict does not occur during the unification 
process. 
The Koryo dynasty was able to build upon the foundation set in place by the 
Shilla Kingdom as they rose to power over the peninsula.9  The Koryo Dynasty hosted its 
capital in Kaesong, located roughly in the center of the peninsula, which would later 
become the cornerstone of present day intra-Korean policy.  They also established two 
sub-capitals, one in the northern region of the peninsula in the city of Pyongyang and a 
                                                 
8 Bruce Cumings, Divided Korea: United Future? (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1995), 7. 
9 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 




southern capital in the city of Namkyung, which would become present day Seoul.10  
This could again become a model for establishing a new government, located in Kaesong, 
while the two states merge their societies.  Creating a new capital north of the 38th 
parallel will demonstrate the ROK did not absorb the DPRK, but a new nation favorable 
to all Korean citizens emerged.  The cities of Pyongyang and Seoul can be used as 
regional capitals to report to Kaesong utilizing the current infrastructure to house 
organizations that can assist in the transition.       
The demise of the Koryo dynasty came when one of its generals, Yi Song-gye, 
rejected the foreign presence on the peninsula and created the groundwork for the Yi 
Dynasty, also referred to as the Chosun Dynasty.11  The ability of these past dynasties to 
rule a unified Korean peninsula brings hope to the people of the peninsula and 
demonstrates the level of homogeny throughout Korea.  Many traditions and customs 
associated with modern day Korea originated under the Yi, notably the close relationship 
between Korea and the people of China.  The complexity of Korea’s relationship with 
China will play a pivotal role in any international attempt to assist during unification.      
However, some polices from these historical times are still present and create 
obstacles to moving forward.  Politically, the cultural acceptance for individuals to retain 
power for large periods of time, 10 or more years in the modern age, can be credited to 
the Yi Dynasty.  The acceptance of the Kim family’s rule and their policy of spying on 
local governments are traced back to practices used during the Yi Dynasty.12  A unified 
Korea may have citizens who wish to see the Kim family retain some position of power, 
which is contrary to the international preferences.  This may decrease the acceptance by 
the international community for a new Korea nation as many nations wish to see the Kim 
family removed all power on the peninsula.       
                                                 
10 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 
International, 2005), 22. 
11 Ibid. 





The desire by Yi officials to refrain from participating in international trade by 
isolating the majority of its people from the emerging trade routes earned the peninsula 
the label of “the Hermit Kingdom,” the same title that has been liberally applied to 
modern day North Korean.13  Ironically, the downfall of the Yi Dynasty coincides with 
the signing of its first modern international treaty with Japan in 1876, which legally 
opened the peninsula to foreign presence and pressures.14  The Kangwha Treaty opened 
the ports of Pusan, Inchon and Wonsan to the Meji government in Japan to increase the 
Japanese trade.  Within a few years, western powers demand and received the same 
opportunity for economic trade with the Yi Dynasty held by the Japanese.15  
Once the Yi opened the Korean borders, a flood of merchants came into the 
society and began to weaken the government’s control over its citizens.  Within a few 
decades, the Yi Dynasty needed new ways to modernize in order to keep up with the 
rapidly evolving East Asian environment.  Many Korean diplomats blamed China for 
encouraging the treaty as well as Japan and the United States for exploiting Korean 
citizens for their own economic advancement.  The distrust of foreign powers would 
continue to increase throughout the Yi’s rule while it sought new diplomatic ties to save 
the dynasty.  The opening of North Korean borders for economic gain must be done in a 
way that is not viewed as economic colonization, which could be referenced back to the 
Yi Dynasty and its downfall.        
Korean diplomats turned towards Czarist Russia as a new mentor and source of 
political guidance to help balance the region.  However, when the Russians tried to flex 
their political might on the Korean Peninsula it resulted in a Japanese response that 
started the Russo-Japanese war in 1904.  Korea’s future was now in a state of limbo as its 
new mentor fell on the losing end of a war with an Asian neighbor.  In September 1905, 
Japan emerged victorious and took a dominant political presence on the Korean 
                                                 
13 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 
International, 2005), 34. 
14 Bruce Cumings, Divided Korea: United Future? (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1995), 
13. 
15 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 




peninsula.  In an attempt to secure the dynasty, the Yi leaders signed a treaty in 
November 1905 that placed Korea’s security under the emerging Japanese empire.16   
These intrusive actions by foreign powers over Korea’s future created a feeling of 
distrust for outside nations and the groundwork for the Jueche philosophy to emerge.  
While an atmosphere of distrust started during the Yi Dynasty, it continued to grow after 
the peninsula formally fell under Japan in August 1910 ending the Yi Dynasty.  The next 
35 years of Japanese colonial rule was viewed as “illegitimate and humiliating” by many 
Korean citizens adding to the level mistrust of foreign powers.17  Throughout the 
occupation, the Korean people struggled to maintain their heritage and identity while 
being forced to learn Japanese practices.      
On August 14, 1945, the Second World War in the Pacific ended.  The day is 
marked as a holiday in both Korean states; however, it was not the joyous moment many 
Korean citizens expected.18  Military forces from the USSR and the United States 
replaced the Japanese occupiers and decided the fate of the Korean peninsula without the 
influence of the Korean people.  The United States and the USSR felt Korea was not 
capable of ruling the peninsula without external assistance and made decisions that 
ultimately lead to the modern day division.  The distrust of the United States by the 
DPRK government has spilled over to include the ROK and Japan as they signed security 
agreements with the United States.  The rejection of foreign powers by the DPRK creates 
a barrier for any foreign nation who wishes to get involved with unification efforts 
The last attempt to unify the peninsula came through force on June 15, 1950 when 
the DPRK leader, Kim Il-Sung, launched a military assault and advanced into the 
territory of the ROK, crossing the foreign power’s border of the 38th Parallel.  This 
unexpected military movement quickly brought the tension between the two Korean 
states onto the international scene.  The United Nations responded by passing Security 
                                                 
16 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 
International, 2005), 45-46. 
17 Bruce Cumings, Divided Korea: United Future? (Ithaca, NY: Foreign Policy Association, 1995), 
16-17. 
18 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 




Council Resolution 82 calling for North Korea to pull its forces north of the 38th Parallel 
and allowed United Nation countries to assist the ROK in restoring its sovereignty.19  
While each force made advances deep into the other’s territory, the conflict ended with 
an armistice three years later with the original border of the 38th Parallel restored.  This 
conflict set a precedent as the ROK turned towards the international community for 
assistance while the DPRK went down a path of self-reliance, only relying on help from 
its communist allies in the USSR and the PRC.  While military tensions remain high 
throughout the peninsula, no additional attempts have been made to unite the peninsula 
through military force.  
E. UNIFICATION SCENARIOS 
The presence of foreign powers intervening on the Korean peninsula has created 
an atmosphere where trust is a rare commodity, even between the two Korean states.  
This lack of trust is evident in a popular Korean saying following the end of the Second 
World War, “Do not trust the United States.  Do not be deceived by the Soviet Union.  
Japan will rise again.  Be careful Korea.”20  The decades of occupation and mistrust by 
foreign nations makes the peninsula politically different from most areas of the world.  
To satisfy both Korean nations and continue progress towards unification, the Korean 
states should present ideas that rebuild a single Korean identity that allows the possibility 
of a smooth unification to occur.   
The path to a single Korean nation remains uncertain, but the three scenarios in 
this thesis have the best probability of occurring.  To review, the first scenario is a 
complete collapse of the DPRK government followed by absorption by the ROK creating 
a unified peninsula with a government similar to the present day ROK.  This  
                                                 
19 United Nations Security Council Resolution 82, Session 1501 (June 25, 1950), 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/95/IMG/NR006495.pdf?OpenElement 
(accessed September 8, 2008). 
20 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, The Divided Nation (Westport, Connecticut:  Praeger Security 




scenario was popular throughout the late eighties, increased in the early nineties and 
intensified in the mid nineties after the death of the DPRK’s founding father Kim Il-Sung 
in 1994.  
In a 1995 poll of 48 multinational analysts by Lee Young-sun, sixty percent of the 
analysts believed this scenario would become a reality by the year 2010.21  This view was 
not restricted to academic institution but shared by governmental offices.  A 1996 report 
by the Defense Intelligence Agency of the United States called for a DPRK regime 
collapse in less than three years while the former Director of Central Intelligence, John 
Deutch, predicted the DPRK would collapse within the next three years or continue to 
survive for a significant time into the future.  These views were shared by the public who 
expected a collapse within 10 years while many predicted a collapse would occur in as 
little as 5 years.22  Markus Noland identifies three groups that have historically emerged 
after a regime collapse that could block the overarching goal of unification:  
revolutionaries, political moderates and counter-revolutionaries.23  The presence of these 
groups within the DPRK is currently unknown but must be expected to emerge following 
a collapse.  These groups can delay the unification process and the planning of the 
peninsula’s future goals must consider them.   
The role of economic engagement throughout the peninsula can create an 
atmosphere where both Korean states no longer doubt the other’s intentions while 
growing each states economy focusing on their own comparative advantage.  The DPRK 
claims to have the lowest labor cost, lowest taxes, an untapped market, an abundance of 
qualified labor and the proper legal work for multinational corporations.24  The ROK has 
a large pool of qualified business managers, access to international markets, a stockpile  
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of capital and the willingness to rebuild the DPRK’s industrial sector.  Matching these 
two different economic capacities together can create situations that are economically 
beneficial to both states while laying the groundwork for unification.      
The second scenario involves a slow opening of the DPRK through a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA).  A possible FTA may begin with both Korean states and expand to 
include the PRC, Japan, Russia and the United States.  An FTA can allow the DPRK to 
strengthen its economy while slowly opening its borders to the ideas of foreign nations.  
Strengthening the DPRK’s economy is necessary to provide a relief valve that allows its 
administration an alternate path for income rather than simply seeking rents.  This 
process may take decades as ideas from outside nations trickle into the borders of the 
DPRK as its economy grows.  The close relationship of the nations involved in the FTA 
can help guide the future of the Korean peninsula and may evolve from the ties already 
present in the Six Party Talks. 
Woosang Kim sees the importance of the Korean peninsula as the center of the 
Northeast Asian market.  He believes a free trade area can promote economic prosperity 
while maintaining the United States’ influence throughout the area.25  Edward Olsen feels 
there is a good chance of a free trade zones occurring within Northeast Asia based upon 
the European Union model on both regional and sub regional levels.26  Marcus Noland 
expands upon these potential models for increased trade throughout Northeast Asian by 
citing the North American Free Trade Agreement as a model for the Korean peninsula.27  
The failed economic reforms enacted by the DPRK in 2002 demonstrate its inability to 
grow its economy internally without the help of outside assistance.  With the current age 
of globalization, the DPRK stands to benefit immensely from interacting with the 
international community as businesses continue to search for new areas to construct  
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manufacturing plants with an abundance of local labor.  Allowing a state that was once 
part of a unified Korea inside the borders of the DPRK can be the first step in opening the 
borders to other nations as it increases the economic output.   
While this scenario can build trust between the two Korean states and their 
neighbors, there is no guarantee that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons 
program or push for unification.  The main goal of the FTA would be to close the 
economic gap between the two Korean states without foreign countries operating within 
the DPRK borders.  The history of the peninsula shows the anxiety that can arise if 
external nations operate within the DPRK from the fall of the Yi Dynasty to the division 
enacted following the Second World War and into present day policies.     
The downfall of an FTA would involve the number of nations involved and their 
desired goals of the Korean peninsula.  If a large number of nations are involved in the 
FTA, the DPRK can choose which nations to continue trade while alienating others that 
may be more willing to push for unification.  It places the power to decide who to trade 
with in the lap of the DPRK as its economy grows and removes the influence of the ROK 
over future endeavors that can lead to unification.  If trade fall apart between nations 
within a FTA, the potential for future conflict over economic growth increases creating 
an added layer of hostiles throughout the region.   
The final scenario explores the possibility of expanding upon special economic 
zones within the DPRK.  The current success of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), 
bringing together the business skills of the ROK and the labor from the DPRK, has 
already brought a sense of trust to the peninsula which has been absent for over 50 years.  
While small protests have occurred by both states in response to the other’s actions, they 
have been relatively minor compared to previous disagreements as the complex continues 
to operate.  Similar to an FTA, this scenario will shrink the economic gap between the 
two states reducing any future cost to unify the peninsula.  It also provides the needed 
relief valve for the DPRK administration to refrain from pursuing a larger nuclear 
weapons program.  The power of trade will rest with the ROK who can influence the 
DPRK towards milestones that will aid in the future for stability and unification, contrary 




The influence from the international community will be minimal compared to an 
FTA allowing the two Korean states to guide the future of Korean peninsula.  Getting an 
agreement on the future of the Korean peninsula is easier with a minimal amount of 
nations competing for influence.  If the ROK businesses maintain their desire to invest in 
the DPRK, which appears apparent, trust can flourish first through economic interactions 
and then infiltrate the governments creating the potential for a peaceful unification 
process.  
F. HYPOTHESIS OF THE THESIS 
Throughout this paper, I analyze the three unification scenarios for the Korean 
peninsula using the matrix mentioned earlier, focusing on the need to build trust between 
the two states through economic interdependence before slowly opening North Korea to 
influences from outside nations.  There is no doubt a reduction in the economic gap is 
needed prior to any unification attempt.  I focus on which of the two economic scenarios 
would be the best comparing the FTA and SEZ scenarios side by side.  The security 
aspect of the Korean peninsula is a variable that cannot be overlooked when examining 
the future of the Korean peninsula and will be briefly touched on throughout the 
examination of each scenario.  Through building strong economic ties and a continued 
diplomatic relationship between the two Korean states, the security threat can be reduced.            
The current difference in economic positions will create a rough transition to a 
single government if unification were to occur tomorrow.  The decision by the ROK to 
become involved in the international economy allowed them to become a top ten 
economy within one generation after the state’s conception.  Meanwhile, the DPRK’s 
decision to focus on a self-reliance economy has led to what many scholars have labeled 
a failing state.  If the current difference remains or increases, the ROK, along with the 
international community, would be devastated by the amount of economic aid required  
to merge to two states into a single nation in a short time.  These costs led ROK officials 
to rule out its desire for unification through collapse and absorption in 2007.28 
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The obstacles to a unified Korean peninsula are numerous but the five variables in 
my matrix give a strong indication of which scenario is the most plausible and desirable.  
While this thesis focuses on economic factors with sub-elements of regional stability and 
international acceptance, policy makers should also consider factors outside of this thesis, 
as the potential for unification gets closer.  I demonstrate how economic engagement can 
help create a Korean peninsula under one government, free of nuclear weapons and active 
in the international community that benefits all nations throughout the region. 
G. THE LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
I start this analysis by examining the interactions that have occurred throughout 
the Korean peninsula, including how the national policies have changed from military 
confrontations to economic engagements within the past ten years.  The foundation set by 
Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy has allowed the current ROK President, Lee Myung-
bak, to engage the DPRK economically creating additional opportunities in the future.  
The chapter lays out the theory of economic interdependence while expanding on the 
problems that may obstruct unification.  It concludes with how a unified Korean 
peninsula may act on the international scene as well as how the regional powers view the 
possibility of unification.   
The next chapter reviews and analyzes each state’s economic development and 
discusses how the historical policies can be exploited to aid unification.  The history of 
the DPRK’s development can help explain why the three scenarios are the most accepted 
and help to determine which can be the most beneficial.  It then conducts a review of the 
ROK’s economic development and how it can be used as the cornerstone for change 
throughout the peninsula.  I conclude with how the two states can combine their historical 
policies to create policies that can lead to a new unified Korean state.       
The fourth chapter expands upon the unification scenarios of a DPRK collapse, 
creating a Free Trade Area and expanding Special Economic Zones throughout the 
DPRK.  Each scenario is reviewed and assigned advantages and disadvantages in order to 




matrix for the respective scenario.  The chapter includes a brief historical looks of an 
FTA and SEZ concluding with a head-to-head review of the FTA and SEZs economic 
scenarios.  
I conclude with the scenario I believe will be the best path for the Korean 
peninsula and the international community.  I conduct a review of how SEZ can be 
applied to the DPRK with a review of the Keasong Industrial Complex and the 
interdependent relationship that has already emerged between the two states.  The chapter 
concludes with recommendations that can help merge these two different states into a 
single nation that encompasses aspects of both Koreas.   
As previously stated, numerous variables stand in the way of a unified Korean 
peninsula.  Many studies have focused on the security factors including military forces 
involved in unification but have undervalued the importance of the role of inter-Korean 
economic engagement.  This thesis adds to the material already available to understand 
the advantages that are available through economic interdependence in regards to 
advancing the unification process.  This thesis is not intended to be a stand-alone 
document to plan for Korean unification but must be used in conjunction with other 




II. INTRA-KOREAN AFFAIRS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on background information concerning the Korean peninsula 
including the slow thaw that occurred since the formation of each state in 1948.  I 
examine the various interactions between the two states and how these interactions have 
evolved to allow the ROK to engage the DPRK through economic policies.  I then focus 
on why economic engagement can be beneficial to reducing security tensions on the 
Korean peninsula through the theory of Economic Interdependence.  I lay out some 
potential problems that can obstruct the effort for unification.  I briefly view some 
obstacles that arose during Germany’s unification in the early nineties and how they can 
be applied towards Korea.  I add some insight on how a unified Korean nation may 
appear to the international community and the actions they are likely to take.  The chapter 
concludes with a brief examination of how the surrounding nations may view a unified 
Korean peninsula.    
B. THE SLOW THAW ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
The unification of the Korean peninsula has been a major issue for every Korean 
president, both north and south of the 38th Parallel.  Syngman Rhee, the first South 
Korean president, used unification as the foundation for his policies.  He believed only 
through military force would the two Korean state be reunited.  A report published in 
October 1949 stated, “The [Seoul] Government’s only proposed solution to the problem 
of unification is bullets and bayonets.”29  The ROK continued to support this policy even 
after the failed unification attempt through military force launched by the DPRK in 1950.  
In 1960, President Rhee gave way to a temporary government allowing the rise of 
General Park Chung-Hee through a non-violent coup in 1961.  President Park would be 
the first to change the policy on unification from military actions to peaceful 
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negotiations.30  However, his polices were more talk than action as he dealt with a 
staunch regime in the north.  Kim Il-Sung ruled the DPRK until his death in 1994 where 
his son Kim Jong-Il succeeded him.  The Kim family continues to rely on a path of 
military power in the hope of one day unifying the peninsula through force.     
Talks for unification have occurred since 1971 when both states used their Red 
Cross associations as a conduit to unify families separated since the civil war.  The initial 
rounds of negotiations lasted for two years and ended with a DPRK protest over the 
ROK’s desire to enter the United Nation.  Talks resumed in 1984 when the DPRK offered 
assistance to the ROK after the state was devastated by massive floods.  This round of 
talks again lasted for two years and ended as the DPRK protested the combined military 
exercises between the ROK and the United States.  The ROK extended an invitation for 
talks again in 1988, which has shown a steady stream of “on again, off again” relations 
between the two Koreas.31          
Recent history shows the continued thaw in the relationship between these two 
states.  Former ROK presidents’ ideas of peaceful negations would slowly evolve into 
President Kim Dae-Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” throughout his tenure from 1998-2003.32  
This non-violent policy towards North Korea culminated with his historic trip to 
Pyongyang in June of 2000, where Kim Jong-Il greeted him at the airport.  Some South 
Korean citizens saw the Sunshine Policy as an appeasement to the Kim Jong-Il 
government in return for a reduction of tension on the peninsula.  The keystone of the 
policy was the development and opening of the Mount Kumgang tourist area by Hyundai, 
a South Korean company.  Hyundai agreed to give North Korea over $900 million dollars 
over a span of seven years for the ability to operate the tourist area.33  While this contract 
was very profitable for North Korea, it gave little back to the citizens of South Korea.  
                                                 
30 Chung Hee Park, Toward Peaceful Unification: Selected Speeches (Seoul, Korea: Kwangmyong 
Publishing Company, 1976), 81. 
31 The United States’ State Department Official Website on North Korea 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (accessed February 9, 2009). 
32 Manwoo Lee, “Sunset for Kim Dae-Jung’s sunshine policy?” Current History 101, no. 101 (April 
2002), 166.   




While some South Korean families were able to reunite with family living in the north, 
the number of families was limited.  The ROK’s current president, Lee Myung-bak, has 
built upon the “Sunshine Policy” and made economic engagement with North Korea a 
top priority. 
These actions between the DPRK and the ROK have demonstrated a new policy 
for future endeavors.  The last ten years have seen the two states continue to 
communicate through both the business and governmental sectors.  In May 2007, a 
historical event occurred within the DMZ when two trains traveled along the recently 
reconnected railroads, one heading north and the other traveling south.34  While it is hard 
to claim any military confrontation between the two states is gone forever, the two states 
appear to be moving towards an era focusing on policies that aid in economic 
development. 
C.  WHY CHOOSE ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT? 
The theory of economic interdependence has been viewed as a source to reduce 
conflict between nation states since the creation of the western nation state in the 17th 
century.  The main hypothesis of the theory states nations would choose to forgo conflict 
when their trade is tightly interconnected.  The theory is expanded to describe the 
variance in cost for each nation to maintain peaceful ties vice mobilizing forces for war.  
If a high degree of interdependence exists between two nations, they will prefer to 
maintain their advantages through trade rather than risk the uncertainty that comes with 
conflict.         
The theory of economic interdependence goes beyond the simplistic view that 
nations will not engage in war when there is high correlation of interactions between two 
nations concerning their economic production.  The theory is reduced down to two 
schools of thought, one liberal and the other realist.  I will first explain the realist  
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viewpoint and then proceed into the liberal aspect, the main argument for the spread of 
economic interdependence and the reason why trade can benefit the Korean peninsula’s 
quest for unification.   
The realists, or traditionalists, believe economic interdependence will lead to 
increased conflicts between nations.  These scholars point towards the two World Wars 
that occurred throughout Europe and the Pacific theater in the first half of the 20th century 
as the involved nations’ economies were tightly intertwined.  The potential for the loss of 
a vital economic component from country A to country B forces country B to invade 
country A, ensuring their supply chain remains uninterrupted.  They also view real power 
lying in military assets, which are used to end conflicts and secure their economic 
future.35  Since the two Korean states have broken communication lines with each other 
numerous times in the past without engaging in a war, I will not focus any further on this 
aspect of the theory.  The desire of each state’s largest ally, the United States for the 
ROK and the PRC for the DPRK, to avoid a conflict on the Korean peninsula that might 
bring these two powers to war decreases the possibility of conflict.    
Data since the end of the Second World War reinforces the liberal theory of 
economic interdependence and suggests that we may now be in an era where the 
preferred political stance is swaying towards economic interdependence and away from 
military action.  The liberal aspect of the theory states an increase in economic 
cooperation will increase peace between two nations, in direct opposition to the realist 
view.  The liberal theorists believe “close economic contacts contribute to peace by 
making war irrational and useless.  Free trade contributes to peace by allowing the flow 
of goods across national borders for mutual gains, making war more costly and 
consequently less likely between trading partners.”36   
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye expanded upon the theory of economic 
interdependence by suggesting the formation of a complex interdependence between 
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nations with high levels of economic trade.  This includes the development of various 
paths for communication and information flowing towards the governmental leaders, 
while removing the realist idea of a hierarchical international society and eliminating the 
use of military forces against other nations in the same geographic location.37  These 
additional variables are necessary to understand as the world continues to evolve and 
become more globalization.  This complex interdependence is believed to make the threat 
or use of force less likely between nations that maintain these connections through 
economic trade.          
The first aspect of the additional variables, the increased lines of communications, 
has steadily increased through globalization.  As multinational corporations (MNC) 
continue to grow, nations that were once underdeveloped are now becoming 
industrialized with the help of companies from other nations.  These MNC usually 
contain a headquarters in an industrialized country while maintaining production factories 
in a developing country.  The MNC’s headquarters are usually located outside of the 
manufacturing nation, where they ensure their nation’s policies are beneficial to the 
manufacturing nation, ensuring economic growth for all involved.  This relatively new 
concept (the last 20 years) has placed these firms inside the decision cycle of various 
leaders throughout the world.38  This concept is defined by the increase communication 
between the ROK and the DPRK through the KIC and the South Korean companies that 
have set up factories in the complex at Kaesong.   
The second aspect of the theory deals with the absence of the hierarchical society, 
which has been a focal point of foreign policy decisions since the treaty of Westphalia.  
The creation of various international institutions including the United Nations, 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the emergence of the European Union has 
aided in tearing down the old hierarchical society.  While nations still strive to become 
world superpowers, the disparity between the nations on the next tier has shrunk 
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significantly over the past few decades.39  On the Korean peninsula, no hierarchical 
structure exists; only the desires by both states to one day become a single nation with the 
potential to become a world leader.   
The last variable of complex interdependence is the shrinking role of military 
forces between nations co-located in the same geographic sphere.  The fear of attack from 
neighboring states has drastically decreased with the availability of membership into the 
international and regional institutions.  The cooperation between nations that once were 
clearly defined enemies reinforces this concept.  Examples include Canada removing the 
fear of an invasion from the United States, Germany and Great Britain no longer fearing 
the rise of the other and France discarding their once doctrinal policy of defense in every 
direction.  While countries may still engage in conflicts away from their borders, the 
desire to wage war close to home has diminished.40  The threat of military actions 
remains present on the Korean peninsula but has been steadily decreasing since the 
enactment of the “Sunshine Policy” and the follow on policy of economic engagement.   
Dale Copeland adds the additional variable of future trade to the theory of 
economic interdependence.  He uses the uncertainty of future trade to explain the Second 
World War that has historically been used to rebuke this theory.  Copeland explains that 
although Germany and Japan both held an advantage in all aspects of realist power prior 
to the Second World War in their respected region, they only sought to invade after their 
prospects for future trade had fallen significantly.41  If their prospects for future trade 
remained high, both nations would have continue their economic expansion without a 
fear of their raw materials being restricted by neighboring nations.  These nations would 
have chosen a peaceful coexistence rather than seek war which caused their decline. 
This future expectation of trade along with the additional variables presented by 
Keohane and Nye can help place the significance of using economic engagement to help 
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unify the Korean peninsula.  The multiple channels of communication already present 
can ensure national decision makers have the required information needed before 
enacting a policy that may lead to a conflict.  The removal of potential military forces 
against another nation regionally can give leaders the necessary time needed to make a 
rational decision.  While not much is known about the DPRK decision making cycle, we 
can concluded that giving their state a source of future economic growth can keep 
communication lines open to defray any potential security concerns. 
As with all theories, this one holds some flaws.  While it states nations can reduce 
the security risk between two enemies, the prospect for conflict is always present.  It also 
states nations would choose to pursue policies that place economic growth ahead of 
security concerns but does not guarantee unification of a divided nation.  The theory has 
been applied to nations that are internationally recognized and developed.  The use of the 
theory against a failed or failing state may bring a different outcome against two states 
considered developed. 
D. PROBLEMS FOR UNIFICATION 
The unification of Korea is an end state that many countries desire, however the 
complexity of the present variables create obstacles that lead some countries to maintain 
the status quo.  Some nations may prefer to keep what they are familiar with rather than 
force a unification that creates a nation with additional influence and responsibility within 
the region.  Only through years of cooperation with a shared vision for common goals can 
the two Korean states bring the environment on the peninsula towards an atmosphere that 
creates a potential unification beneficial to all parties involved.   
The economic relations between the ROK and the DPRK are already showing 
benefits of the economic interdependence theory as interactions are increasing daily 
while both economies grow, trust is being built, additional lines of communications are 
installed and the use of military assets are minimized.  The PRC and the United States 




on the peninsula.  Outside nations must accept the thaw occurring on the peninsula while 
withholding from making political moves that may jeopardize the progress made between 
the two Korean governments.                  
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program continues to be a major obstacle that 
keeps many nations from encouraging the expansion of economic ties.  Its government 
can enhance and promote trade alliances by eliminating its nuclear weapons program and 
removing the largest security threat from the peninsula.  Eliminating its nuclear weapons 
program and allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspection teams to operate 
within its borders will demonstrate to the international community the DPRK’s 
commitment to conform to U.N. rules and regulations.  Recent actions, including 
increasing its transparency and cooperating with new treaties have assisted in the removal 
of North Korea from the United States’ State Sponsors of Terrorism List, allowing the 
state access to low interest international loans.42   
South Korea continues to make strides to normalize relations with North Korea 
with a goal of closing the economic disparity between the two states.  This goal is a result 
of Germany’s experience as South Korea tries to reduce the cost of unification in the 
event of a collapse.  Although the ROK can use Germany’s unification as a template to 
plan for unification, it will still have to overcome variables that were absent in 
Germany’s unification.  Other variables, which are not currently visible due to the closed 
nature of the DPRK society, must also be anticipated and planned.  If the two economies 
continue their present growth rates, the cost of unification will only slightly decrease.  A 
rapid change in economic reforms must occur within the DPRK, preferably with the help 
of the ROK, to ensure growth is maintained.  South Korean officials have made it clear 
the importance of continuing inter-Korean economic cooperation as they create a 
relationship where both states are equal.  President Roh stated without overcoming this  
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economic hurdle, “unification will remain far away.”43  However, as time continues to 
pass and economic reforms continue to fail within North Korea, the process of unification 
will continue to be slow and very expensive.  
The unification of Germany saw two nations unite from different social, political, 
ideological and economical paths.44  This brought a tremendous shock to the citizens of 
the two nations as prejudices were still abound in everyday activities, very different from 
the utopian outlook of one happy German nation.45  One must examine this variable 
when dealing with the two Korean states.  Each state continues to believe they are the 
rightful government of a unified Korean nation.46  Currently, the only solution to who 
would govern the new nation would be a total collapse of the DPRK government 
followed by absorption by the ROK.  Yet, this scenario is the most undesirable by the 
ROK and the international community.   
 In a poll conducted in 2001 by North Korean defectors and South Korean college 
students, the division of the nation remains in the minds of many Korean citizens.  While 
all participants preferred the lifestyle of the ROK, many defectors still associated 
themselves more with the citizens of North Korea.47  Likewise, the South Korean 
students felt a stronger association with South Korea than the north, while a small 
percentage remained neutral.  A new national image must be created that allows the 
citizens of Korea to view themselves as a single Korean people, disassociated from the 
division of the Second World War, as they strive towards an unified nation.  Political 
unification will only take the nation to a certain point before the social division erupts 
and halts the development of a single Korean nation.                                   
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E. HOW A UNIFIED KOREA MAY LOOK 
A unified Korean nation has the potential to take on a number of different 
personas.  However, the most likely to emerge is a nation very similar to the modern day 
ROK, based on a democratic governmental style and an open-market economy.  The 
focus on economic development appears to remain a top priority, as the new nation will 
strive to balance the living conditions throughout the peninsula.  The potential for the 
new government to retain its nuclear capability remains low as allied nations would push 
to denuclearize the peninsula and remove the possibility of an arms race throughout the 
region.  The majority of the security concerns after unification will be internal to the 
nation as it focuses on national development while providing a rule of law.  The focus of 
a unified Korean nation will be managing the migration of citizens to various regions in 
search of a better life while providing the necessary aid for the health of citizens.48  The 
international disputes currently present will not be resolved, as the new government will 
wish to maintain the status quo until its internal issues are resolved.     
The government can be expected to take a centralist stance as they attempt to 
please both the United States and the PRC.  This includes reframing from taking any 
actions that may give one ally an indications the other is preferred.49  The correct 
accountability and removal of nuclear weapons appears to be a major milestone for the 
international community and will aid in restoring peace throughout the region.  The 
economic ties between a unified Korea and the surrounding nations are expected to 
increase leading to additional security throughout the region as predicted by the theory of 
economic interdependence.  Having a transparent government throughout the unification 
process will assist in reducing security concerns throughout the region while creating the 
foundation for future economic cooperation throughout the international community.         
 
                                                 
48 Kang Suk Rhee, “Korea’s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience,” Asian Survey 
33, no. 4 (1993), 367. 
49 Derek J. Mitchell, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” The Washington 




F. HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY VIEWS KOREAN 
UNIFICATION 
For this assessment, I will assume that a Unified Korean peninsula emerged 
through a peaceful process centered on a strong economic policy that increased the 
DPRK’s economy to a manageable level.  While some of the analysis draws from the 
hypothesis state above, I will assume that no large changes have been made throughout 
the international community with the nations of the six-party talks as regional players.  
The United States will maintain its status as the world hegemonic power with the PRC 
continuing to see its influence throughout the region rise.  The Russian Federation 
continues its current level of activity in regional affairs but to a lesser extent than the 
United States, China or Japan.  Nuclear weapons and the facilities associated with 
manufacturing the materials necessary have been dismantled and the nation is open to 
inspections from U.N. monitoring teams.  The following assessments will be from the 
viewpoint of each nation, as each nation’s acceptance of a Unified Korea will help shape 
the future of the region. 
1.  United Nations 
The United Nations has an interesting view of the Korean unification problem as 
the two nations, the United States and Russia, which divided the peninsula are permanent 
members of the UN Security Council and possess the power to veto legislature.  To 
complicate the issue, China also holds a seat as a permanent member of the council and 
with its veto power.50  The number of regional nations with veto power hastens the 
ability of the United Nations to agree on a policy that enables a unified Korean peninsula 
favorable to all parties to emerge.    
China and Russia have traditionally been against any hard sanctions suggested by 
the United States in regards to the DPRK that may accelerate a collapse of its 
government.51  Yet, all parties profess to believe that the Korean peninsula should be free 
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of nuclear weapons.  The passing of UNSC Resolution 1695 on 15 July 2006, 
immediately following missile tests conducted by the DPRK, shows the institution’s 
commitment to ensure peace and stability throughout the region.  The resolution required 
all member states to ensure no missiles or missile related technology was allowed to flow 
into the borders of the DPRK as well as the purchase of any missile already present 
within the DPRK.52  The United Nations had success in passing additional security 
legislature concerning the Korean peninsula, yet have taken no further actions towards 
the two states for reunification.   
2.   The United States of America 
The United States wishes to maintain its current level of influence with the ROK 
over a unified Korean peninsula.  This can be achieved by continued military interactions 
including regularly scheduled deployments and training missions with the new nation’s 
military.  This would ensure the commitment of the United States’ military forces to the 
safety of the new nation after the removal of the threat of a second civil war.  Continuing 
its military presence will keep the Korean peninsula under the nuclear umbrella of the 
United States’, allowing a unified Korea to remove its nuclear arsenal and stop additional 
research into its program.  Having the new nation fall under the United States military 
umbrella will thwart the potential of a new arms race in the region.53      
If the United States wishes to maintain its current influence over the region, it can 
use the newly unified Korea to balance against the rising power of the PRC.  While there 
is no guarantee a unified Korea would favor the United States over that of China, the 
absorption of the old DPRK government into the ROK structure gives the                      
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United States a slight advantage in alliance structure.  Revamping the current bilateral 
agreement between the ROK and the United States to include the new Korea nation with 
the potential to create a trilateral alliance with Japan should be pursued.54   
A strong alliance between the United States, Japan and a unified Korean nation 
can created a force that can shape the future of the region.  The three nations, along with 
Taiwan, can form a force that can compete with a powerful Chinese nation while keeping 
Russia from gaining further influence throughout the region.55  To ensure a successful 
alliance, all parties involved must accept apologies for past atrocities while focusing on a 
common set of goals for the future, both economically and militarily.  
3.   Japan  
Japan has sectors that would welcome the thought of a unified Korean nation that 
shares the same ideas and goals of its current alliance with the United States and those 
that fear the creation of a unified Korea.  The ability to have another nation play a major 
role in shaping the region will alleviate a large financial burden currently held by the 
Japanese government.  These costs include conducting joint security exercises and the 
creation of a missile defense system under development for the region.56  A Korean 
nation that can take on a larger role within the region will allow Japan to focus on more 
national projects.  Economic growth for both nations has helped these nations place 
differences aside and cooperate on joint ventures similar to the normalization of relations 
in 1965 and the future economic opportunities may helped the relationship of these 
nations flourish.            
However, Japan and both Korean states have been unable to compromise on past 
actions and policies.  The Japanese people were outraged when Kim Jong-Il announced 
the kidnappings of Japanese citizens in September 2002.  This announcement turned 
                                                 
54 Kent E. Calder, “U.S. Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” in The International Relations of 
Northeast Asia (Lanham, Maryland:  The Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 240. 
55 Tomotsu Nakano, “A Grand Design for Northeast Asia,” International Journal on World Peace 20, 
no. 3 (September 2003), 43.   
56 Derek J. Mitchell, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” The Washington 




many Japanese citizens away from the possibility of working with the DPRK or 
encouraging a Korean unification.57  Japan and the ROK are still in a dispute over the 
Laincourt Rocks, called Dokdo in Korean and Takashima in Japanese, located between 
the two nations since 1952.58  Currently, no settlement beneficial to both parties has 
evolved over the sovereignty of this territory.  These historical disputes along with the 
past actions of all involved states may lead Japan to maintain the status quo.59           
4.   The People’s Republic of China     
The PRC, similarly to Japan, has the potential for both gains and loses from a 
unified Korean nation.  China has been working both economically and politically with 
the ROK since the early nineties.  This relationship is expected to continue as the PRC 
gains additional influence over the peninsula after unification occurs.  The prospective of 
moving the pendulum of power away from the United States and towards the PRC stands 
at about fifty percent.60  Many experts believe China has been a large influence in 
political matters on the peninsula including getting the leaders of both Korean states 
together in 2000.  They also were instrumental in getting the United States and the DPRK 
together for negotiations in Beijing in April of 2002 after an increase in nuclear 
tensions.61   
Currently, the PRC is pushing to reduce the amount of United State military bases 
throughout the region, specifically on the Korean peninsula.  If the cold war threat of a 
second Korean conflict dissolved, as well as Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the PRC could 
lobby the new Korean government to remove the United States military footprint from  
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the peninsula altogether, increasing its own security.62  The United States has already 
begun to downsize its forces throughout the ROK, including removing United States’ 
nuclear weapons in the early nineties.63    
The strong influence of the PRC was visible when the government of the DPRK 
unilaterally announced a special administrative zone to be constructed on the border town 
of Sinuiju in 2002, governed by a Chinese executive named Yang Bing.64  The desire of 
Chinese businesses to gamble on an unstable business opportunity with the potential for 
high returns shows the potential the DPRK has for future economic growth.  The 
downfall of the zone occurred when Chinese authorities arrested Yang Bing in China for 
tax evasion.  Many see his arrest as a diplomatic gesture to the Kim Regime not to pull 
resources from China without alerting China’s government.     
Conversely, the bustling growth of the PRC made investment into mainland China 
desirable for many ROK businesses.  In 2004, the PRC overtook the United States as the 
most advantageous location for ROK business investments.65  One can expect the PRC to 
reciprocate and invest into a unified Korea when the economic atmosphere becomes more 
stable in the northern region than it currently is.  This can aid in rebuilding the former 
DPRK with the potential for a high business return.      
The relationship between the ROK and the PRC continues to flourish.  There has 
been an increase in tourism between the two nations and we can expect these interactions 
to increase after unification.  In 2001, the PRC replaced the United States as the most 
traveled destination by ROK citizens for personnel travel.66  Coinciding with an increase  
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in tourism, inter-military exercises have been occurring between these two nations.  
Naval vessels from the PRC and the ROK began to make port visits in different cities in 
each country strengthening their relationship.   
These interactions increase the PRC’s soft power as citizens from each nation 
continue to learn about the other’s cultures.  The Chinese language of Mandarin is now 
taught at over 160,000 high schools and universities throughout South Korea.  
Furthermore, over 13,000 South Korean students are now studying abroad in the PRC 
each year.67  These educational exchanges can help ease interactions on business and 
military platforms while creating additional educational facilities in both nations when 
unification occurs.   
However, the PRC may loose some influence as the new Korean government may 
wish to be viewed as an equal with its regional neighbors.  Historically, the Korean 
peninsula has been subservient to the Chinese nation.  This will remove the current level 
of influence the PRC currently maintains over the northern half of the peninsula.  The 
worst outcome for the PRC will be a unified Korean peninsula that solidifies its alliance 
with the United States and Japan to balance against the growing power and threat that has 
been accumulating throughout China.  Some PRC officials see North Korea as a buffer 
state to keep United States forces from its border while still enjoying the economic trade 
with the ROK.68  Yet, it is still unseen which nation a unified Korean will favor, if indeed 
they prefer one country at all.    
5.   The Russian Federation 
Russia has the most to gain from a unified Korean peninsula.  Since the Second 
World War, they had tremendous influence over the Kim family’s rule of the DPRK until 
the USSR collapsed in the early nineties.  Its position on both the UN Security Council 
and the Six-Party Talks demonstrate its desire to help shape the future of the peninsula.  
Russia continues to be a supplier of energy for the DPRK and would benefit from a 
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unified Korean peninsula where it can send fuel through the former DPRK to the 
industrial areas located in the southern half of the peninsula.   
Additional economic expansion on the Korean peninsula will cause the demand 
for energy to increase, which Russia wishes to supply from its fields in Siberia.  The 
ROK already wishes to decrease its reliance on the Middle East for its energy needs and 
has a neighboring country with a large supply.69  We can expect Russia to encourage 
cooperation between the DPRK and other members of the Six-Party talks while slowly 
apply reforms, which can lead to a unified Korean nation.70   
G.  CONCLUSION 
The slow thaw on the Korean peninsula brings hope that the two Korean states 
may focus on common goals and one day to become a single nation.  The recent 
engagement by South Korea towards the DPRK shows a potential for the establishment 
of trust between the two states that can lead to a set of common goals.  Choosing an 
engagement strategy that connects the two economies can lead to peace and continued 
cooperation as seen in the economic interdependence theory.    
The powerful neighbors of the Korean peninsula all wish to seek a stable Korean 
peninsula.  The ability of these nations to come together through the Six-Party Talks has 
created an environment that can lead to additional cooperation for the future of the 
Korean peninsula.  While this venue focuses on the DPRK nuclear problems, it can 
transform into a working group that removes the additional obstacles standing in the way 
of a unified Korean peninsula.  The role of Korea’s neighbors will be instrumental in 
assisting with the removal of the major issues blocking unification but a template should 
be drafted that will address their interests jointly.   
The lack of a center of gravity that can be removed to ensure unification occurs 
makes any study a smaller piece of the larger puzzle.  The change in leadership that 
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outside nations incur has the ability to influence policy in the region while a single action 
by either of the Korean states makes foreign policy a sensitive issue.  Any government 
who wishes to get involved in the unification process must ensure its actions take the 
policies of surrounding nations into effect.  All regional players must give some 
accessions while cooperating with formal foes to ensure they maintain their strategic 
goals of a peaceful unification while allowing the Korean people to shape its destiny.  
The one aspect that all outside nations agrees on is a unification of the Korean peninsula 
should be long and slow, to decrease the amount of aid that is required as well as slowly 






III. ONE PENINSULA – TWO ECONOMIC PATHS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Korean peninsula may possess citizens that were once from the same 
historical background but each state has chosen polar opposite economic paths.  The 
DPRK’s choice was a socialist model based on the Soviet’s design to excel under the 
heavy supervision of the national government.  When the state was created on September 
9, 1948, it held many economic advantages over the ROK, left in place by the Japanese 
colonization including a heavy industry infrastructure with an abundance of natural 
resources.71  The basic model of development has not significantly altered since its 
creation, although the central government has attempted various reforms.    
The ROK chose a capitalist model with guidance from United States’ advisors to 
shape its early economic foundation.  Despite the lack of economic knowledge within the 
ROK’s national government, the United States sent large amounts of financial aid and 
technology into the ROK in an attempt to keep the peninsula from falling under a 
socialist cloud.  Many scholars credit the prevention of a ROK internal collapse with the 
commitment shown by the United States early in the state’s development.72  
This chapter focuses on the paths that each state chose and how each state’s 
polices can aid or hinder future unification.  I first focus on the DPRK who choose a path 
of self-reliance.  I then focus on the ROK and its decision to accept aid from the 
international community and connect to the world markets.  The ROK also put aside past 
difference with Japan in return for an increase in economic growth in the sixties that 
allowed the ROK to reach the status of the world’s 13th largest economy within the span 
of one generation.73  When examining the development of the ROK, I analyze the 
interdependence developed between Japan and the ROK and how it helped to stimulate 
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the ROK’s economy.  This chapter concludes with how a similar path of the ROK can be 
followed by the DPRK using historical policies that can assist in leading to the possibility 
of a unified nation. 
B. THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
When observing the statistics originating from the DPRK, one must understand 
the government has an incentive to produce artificial numbers and statistics to 
demonstrate its economic policies are effective.  Markus Noland, an expert in Korean 
economics, compares the experience of viewing the DPRK’s economy to entering 
“Alice’s Wonderland” as many policies and their subsequent outcomes are contrary to 
western thought.74  To analyze the economy of the DPRK, Cold War data will be pulled 
from an official publication originating within the DPRK while more contemporary data 
will be taken from the ROK’s Ministry of Unification.   
The basis of the DPRK economy stems from its philosophy of Jueche, which 
stresses the importance of a state to be self-sufficient without relaying on inputs from the 
outside world.   
In order to materialize its political Chajusong, a country should work out 
all its lines and policies independently in keeping with the actual 
conditions, and carry them out by itself.  This requires its own economic 
strength 
As the Korean saying goes, “To borrow is to go into slavery,” a country 
economically subordinated to another will be controlled by the latter 
politically as well and will have no choice but to do its bidding.75       
This statement appears to take into account the history of the Korean peninsula dating 
back to the Yi dynasty and the foreign nations that influenced it until present day.  Jueche 
also reveals the distrust between the leadership of the DPRK and the international 
community, which remains a hurdle for future unification and outside assistance.   
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The government of the DPRK however caveats the Jueche philosophy by 
expressing the impracticality of completely shunning the outside world.  The government 
believes it is acceptable to rely on the international community for goods that may be to 
costly to produce internally, as long as these imports remain minimal.  The acceptability 
to go outside its borders expands beyond simple goods but includes technology limited to 
nations with a shared culture or historical alliance.76   
The Jueche philosophy has been transformed from an economic policy to a quasi-
religion, encompassing a majority of the North Korean population.  While it may appear 
to be a roadblock for any unification attempts, it can also be utilized by the ROK to 
engage the DPRK solely on an intra-Korean basis.  The Jueche philosophy can assist in 
keeping outside nations out of unification negotiations as the two Korean states attempts 
to create policies that are beneficial to each state.  It gives the ROK a large advantage to 
help set goals that are beneficial to the Korean states without the input of foreign nations 
while focusing on the final goal of unification.        
The economy of the DPRK has attempted to reform on its own since it set out on 
a socialist path in 1948, normally coming from the ruling elite, particularly the Kim 
family.  The top down authorization allows the government to maintain control over the 
reforms enabling the ruling elite to remain in its position of power.  The destruction of 
the Korean War led to a series of “X” Year Economic Plans focused on rebuilding 
different sectors of its economy backed by the central government.77  These top down 
reforms can be utilized to set the stage for future unification.  As common goals are 
established and promulgated to the North Korean society, the central government can 
ensure proper oversight on the completion of these projects.        
The first reforms occurred in the agricultural sector and completed by 1958.78  
Using a form of education by observation, the government was able to create a busting 
sector within a relatively short period.  The same form of education by observation can 
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help propel the people of North Korea to learn new principles through all facets of its 
economy.  The ROK should understand the potential associated with this principle as it 
introduces new managerial tools throughout the North Korean economy.         
After the agricultural sector was stable, the nation’s focus shifted to its industrial 
sector with another plan to begin in 1957.79  The destruction caused by the Korean War 
allowed immense growth to occur as the nation replaced the destroyed infrastructure with 
modern factories and mills.  The DPRK workers were able to accomplish this plan within 
three years and created an annual growth rate of 36.6 percent.  This allowed the country 
to build numerous small and medium sized factories while creating urbanized areas.80 
The next seven-year economic plan, scheduled from 1961-1967, brought an 
increase in distrust between the DPRK and the international community.  Realizing the 
completion of the plan would not occur on time, the government added a three-year 
extension to the plan.  The failure to meet the goal of the 1967 end date was placed on the 
international community, specifically the United States and its actions in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and its military entry into the Vietnam conflict.81  This blame would 
continue throughout present day creating a sensitive situation on the peninsula whenever 
United States’ forces are involved, either militarily or politically.     
During this plan, the DPRK ceased to publish official data that would allow 
outside observers to understand its development.  The focus shifted from industrial and 
infrastructure projects to building the military.  The DPRK did published data for its 
military expenditures including doubling the previous spending between the years of  
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1966 and 1967 while tripling the amount between 1967 and 1971.82  Throughout the 
seventies, the DPRK debt continued to increase which eventually lead the regime to 
default on numerous loans taken from the international community.83        
The final seven-year plan was meant to last between 1987 and 1993 in which the 
state hoped to modernize its economy and realize the goal of self-reliance under the 
Jueche philosophy.  Plans were put forth to increase key industries including the domestic 
power supply, allowing the nation to develop without relying heavily on foreign oil.  The 
plan included the completion of a hydroelectric power station, thermal power plants and a 
large nuclear power facility.84  
While this seven-year plan resulted in a low average GDP growth of 2.88% until 
1989, the fall of the Soviet Union stopped all progress on this plan.  The removal of 
assistance from the Soviet Union forced the DPRK’s economy to shrink by an average of 
4.35% through the last four years of the plan.  The DPRK was never able to rebound 
from this seven-year plan, as its economy would continue to shrink at an average rate of 
3.44% over the next six years.85  With no guidance on how to kick-start the economy, 
Kim Il-Sung looked towards his military to once again energize the economy and began 
to focus on the development of nuclear weapons.86    
The DPRK’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons increased military tensions 
throughout the international community including how to handle the notion of a nuclear-
armed DPRK.  The United States took the lead and reached a bilateral agreement with the 
DPRK on October 21, 1994, titled the Agreed Framework Treaty.  The design of the 
treaty served as a roadmap that both nations could pursue including North Korea halting 
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its nuclear weapons program in return for an increase in aid.  The treaty focused on the 
construction of light water reactors within the DPRK, providing an alternative nuclear 
energy source without the fear of its material being transformed into military weapons.87  
While the LWRs were under construction, an international organization would oversee 
heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea providing immediate energy relief while 
ensuring there was no need to restart the nuclear program.  A major violation of this 
treaty occurred in October 2002 when DPRK officials revealed to a United States 
diplomat that North Korea held a secret uranium program to develop additional nuclear 
weapons.88   
C. REVIEW OF NORTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC SECTORS   
A report released in 1993 suggested the labor force is still equally divided among 
the agricultural, industrial and service sectors within North Korea.89  However, judging 
from the absence of the military, we can conclude that this report is not complete.  The 
military is believed to have grown significantly throughout the history of the DPRK with 
over a million people in uniform and comprising roughly 25-30% of its GDP.90  If the 
economic sectors are still divided equally, simple reforms in each sector provided by the 
ROK can aid in establishing growth while building trust on the peninsula.   
The primary issue appears to be the DPRK’s agricultural cooperative farms.  
While there is an abundance of labor of this sector, without proper oversight and goals for 
reforms, North Korea may never be able to see the significant increase in crop production 
needed to provide the basic needs for its citizens.  New techniques and equipment 
brought through the ROK, without violating the philosophy of Jueche, can bridge the gap 
needed to provide the DPRK with the necessary means to provide an adequate food  
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supply.  An increase in production through South Korean ideas and products will open 
the door for the average North Korean citizens to understand the potential rewards of 
receiving new ideas and equipment into the state.       
The industrial sector is primarily focused on light industry and factories that 
produce materials for the military.  The lack of an export market, including working 
within restrictions placed on its goods through embargoes established by the United 
States and upheld by allies, makes the expansion of this industry unlikely without any 
external assistance.  Its historical ties with the PRC allow them to hold a small export 
market across its northern border at the expense of running a high trade deficit.91   
The lack of modern technology compounded with a dwindling supply of repair 
parts has forced the stagnation of this sector that operates at 30% capacity.92  The lack of 
incentives for creative thinking by factory managers has created an atmosphere where 
maintaining the status quo becomes the goal.  This creates an opening for the ROK to 
engage the DPRK economically spurring new growth that is beneficial to both states.  
Increased trade throughout the peninsula will add an additional market for DPRK goods 
while additional capital flows towards the north.                   
Encompassing over 1 million citizens in active service, the military appears to be 
the cornerstone of the DPRK’s economic production.  The sheer size of the military 
creates a potential obstacle for a future unification.  If the two Korean states merge 
removing the security threat, the military will be downsized increasing unemployment 
throughout the northern area of the peninsula.  A slow demobilization of the military over 
time can be one goal of the two Korean states allowing ex-military leaders to join the 
business sector as it expands as the economy grows with the assistance of the ROK.   
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Another goal can be to form a civil engineering corps from military units.  This new 
corps can assist in expanding its infrastructure, as more areas are required as the 
industrial needs expand.93     
The government sector accounts for roughly 90% of the national income.  Using a 
“rent-seeking” strategy, the government brings in funding through the international 
community in return for cooperating with international norms and laws.94  Illegal 
activities, including counterfeiting money, drug trafficking and sales of weaponry are 
major contributors to the North Korean economy.  Estimates show North Korea receives 
between $15 and $20 million annually through the counterfeiting of foreign currency.  Its 
illegal drug trafficking is believed to render between $500 million to $1 billion annually.  
These activities will hinder unification if they continue while the ROK engages the 
DPRK economically leading to an increase in revenue.  The transparency and removal of 
these programs needs to occur before an atmosphere of trust emerges on the peninsula 
and the international community.95    
The development of nuclear weapons severely reduced the regions stability and 
any hope for unification.  A single shipment of military equipment, both nuclear and 
conventional, can bring in millions of dollars to the DPRK.96  North Korea has been 
exploiting this fear to gather additional aid from its neighbors while strengthening the 
ability of the current leadership to retain its power.97  Without an alternative to this 
lucrative program, the DPRK will continue to strive for a large arsenal while continuing  
to smuggle materials to other nations.  The leverage that can be applied by the ROK once 
economic interdependence is achieved can help remove this program from the peninsula 
while providing an alternate source of income for the DPRK.        
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The ROK can force the DPRK to continue down a path of cooperation while still 
within its ideology of Jueche making assistance from other nations undesirable.  The 
ROK can halt additional investments and construction until the leadership of the DPRK 
takes specific measures to restrict its ability to increase the instability on the Korean 
peninsula.  The measures can go beyond security and be laden with benchmarks and 
measures that assist in the long-term goal of unification.  The DPRK will be more 
dependent upon the ROK as the relationship continues to evolve.  Historically, the PRC 
or Russia has held similar power, but its ability to control the DPRK’s will contract as the 
ROK establishes a normalized relationship providing the needed materials to modernize 
the DPRK’s economy.    
D.  ECONOMIC REFORMS 
The DPRK constitution of 1998 laid the path for eventual economic reforms.  
This document brought drastic shifts into the DPRK including viewing technical 
advances as the foundation for economic develop while still maintaining the Jueche 
ideology.  However, the constitution allowed the state to develop trading partners from 
the international community with a mutual respect for both parties, contrary to its history 
of only trading with nations that shared a common culture or ideology.  Article 37 
specifically states the potential to development institutions that are beneficial to both 
parties through SEZs.98  
 Historically, the driving force behind increasing the North Korean economy was 
to increase the inputs to garner a larger output.  The lacks of inputs throughout the 
eighties lead to a decade of stagnation coupled with the fall of the USSR and a decade of 
economic decline in the nineties.99  The current economic conditions within North Korea 
keep the state from providing the basic needs for its citizens without the access to 
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additional aid.100  Without an ally that was able to increase the inputs to its economy, the 
state tried to establish growth through new ideas and reforms.     
The economic reforms implemented in July 2002 demonstrate the desire of the 
DPRK to change its current way of running its economy.  These reforms incorporated all 
aspects of the North Korean economy including creating special economic zones while 
continuing to seek rents from the international community.101  These policies, 
implemented without the help of foreign nations, were a final attempt to increase 
production while slowly reshaping the Jueche philosophy.  Many policies enacted had 
capitalistic undertones, the same ideology which DPRK leaders have been against since 
the creation of the state.  The change in policy brings hope that, with assistance from the 
ROK, the DPRK can connect to the world economy creating a similar economy to the 
counterparts in the south.     
A major change in microeconomic policy allowed farmers and factories to keep 
excess products after meeting the governmental quota and selling these goods on an open 
market in the state.  This allowed the government to remove the state sponsored subsidies 
and allowed new markets to set the price of goods.  While this initially caused a 
momentary increase in production, it also allowed inflation rates to increase.  Without 
allowing private business to break free from the state led development model 
incorporating a complete reform, future problems would soon arise.     
The government also backed wage increases for a small portion of occupations 
throughout the state while others professions kept their original salaries.102  This caused a 
chain reaction throughout the DPRK as the overall price of commodities increased faster 
than the average wage.  The price of fuel increased 40 times, electricity 60 times and rice  
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over 400 times.103  Rather than creating a better standard or living, as expected by the 
government, this policy pushed the standard of living down, as citizens had to pay more 
for necessary everyday products. 
A second reform taken by the DPRK was the re-establishment of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs).  In a move to emulate the SEZs of China during the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s, the DPRK established a SEZ in Rajin-Sobong in the northeast region of 
the state in 1991.104  The decision of the isolated region of Rajin-Sobong was designed to 
keep the bulk of its citizens away from any idea resembling capitalism while benefiting 
from an increase in production.  However, the isolated location, lack of incentives for 
foreign investment and the poor infrastructure would be the Achilles heel as bringing 
materials and workers into the zone was more difficult than expected leading to its 
failure.   
Learning from this mistake, a new SEZ was scheduled for construction under the 
2002 reforms on the Chinese border town of Sinuiju with help from foreign businessmen.  
It was meant to run as a Special Administration Zone (SAZ) which could operate outside 
of the government’s jurisdiction and pursue principles that may be in violation of the 
Jueche mentality, including privatizing factories and using the United States dollar as the 
primary currency.105  Many Chinese businesses began to invest in the project seeing an 
opportunity for high returns from a minimal investment.  However, the zone never came 
to fruition as Chinese authorities under the violation of “fraud and illegal land use” 
arrested the prospective governor, Chinese executive Yang Bing, after the announcement 
of his position.106  The reason for the arrest may have come from the failure of the DPRK 
to notify the PRC about the establishment of the zone that started to pull resources from 
the PRC. 
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Following these failed reforms and the resultant shrinking economy, the DPRK’s 
focus reverted back to its nuclear weapon program.  Its policy to pursue nuclear weapons 
sparked a reaction from the region to organize the six-party talks, which continue to be a 
source of negations between all regional players.  The desire to reform its economy 
internally with minimal results demonstrates a change within the DPRK that has been 
absent for most of its existence.  The desire to attempt SEZs and create reforms within its 
borders has opened the door for the engagement that would later come by the ROK.  
Engaging with outside nations, first through the ROK with the potential to accept 
additional outside assistance creates a situation that can bridge the gap between the two 
Korean economies.   
The tremendous growth seen following the Korean War through the sixties shows 
the potential for North Korea to create a bustling economy.  The evolution of the socialist 
ideology is seen as they attempted to implement capitalist reforms and open SEZs within 
its borders give an indication of accepting a new way forward that can be achieved with 
the help of the ROK.  The continued interactions between the two Korean states show the 
acceptance of the DPRK to accept international ideas as it transforms it state.    
E. REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
The Republic of Korea’s approach to economic development could not have been 
successful without the aid it received by the international community.  The development 
of the businessmen, bureaucrats and other modern day professionals occurred during the 
Japanese occupation and created a pool of talent that would guide the economic 
development of the country.107  The alliance between the United States and South Korea 
created a large United States market for South Korean goods, which fostered its export-
oriented strategy since the sixties.     
Although growth was particularly slow for the early years of the state, the North 
Korean offensive in 1950 served as a catalyst for short-term development.  Immediately 
following the end of the Korean War, the United States issued a financial aid package 
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that would total $1 billion with continued military support.108  This package allowed the 
South Korean government to focus on developing its economic foundation without 
diverging large amounts of money for the expansion and maintenance of its military as it 
fell under the United States military’s security umbrella.  Throughout the 1950’s, over 
80% of South Korea’s income came through subsidies issued by the United States.109    
The largest change to the ROK’s economic reforms came in the early 1960’s 
when the United States drafted a plan to decrease the financial aid to South Korea.  In 
response, the new South Korean President Park, Chung Hee, introduced a five-year plan 
focusing on economic industrialization.  These reforms were self-lead and established a 
new export oriented strategy to build the nation.  President Park create the Korean Trade 
Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) to provided industries “exceptions from duties on 
imported intermediates, tax incentives, preferential access to capital, special depreciation 
allowances on imported capital equipment, and a variety of non-pecuniary awards.”110  
The creation of this institution allowed South Korean goods to reach larger markets 
throughout the world while companies imported technology and equipment at lower 
costs.     
In 1965, South Korea initiated the normalization of economic ties with Japan, its 
formal colonizers and enemy, through a formal treaty.  The treaty was lead by President 
Park who saw an opportunity to expand his state’s trade to a larger market within close 
geo-graphic proximately.111  The normalization could not have occurred under President 
Rhee, who was an advocate against further Japanese influence on the Korean Peninsula 
with the potential of economic colonization.  President Park believed normalizing 
relations with Japan would enhance his state’s credibility on the international stage while 
opening these markets to Korean goods.   
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 This relationship blossomed into a complex interdependence that has lasted for 
over 40 years.  The Korean peninsula has been the principal area for investment by 
Japanese businesses since 1951, accounting for over 54% of all investments.  Along with 
monetary investment, the exchange of information and technology has allowed South 
Korea to reorganize its factories and to ensure it produces goods at the most efficient 
level.112 
These close economic ties continue today has helped to dampen security concerns 
between the two nations that have been present since the Second World War.  Figure 1 
shows trade data between South Korea and Japan since 1988 using the following formula 
to measure their interdependence: 
Exports + Inputs 
GDP X 100 
The data show South Korea has a larger stake in cooperating with Japan as a larger 
percentage of its economy benefits from this economic relationship.  If a complex 
economic interdependence occurred between the ROK and the DPRK, we can expect the 
DPRK’s economy to be more reliant on the ROK’s economy due the difference in size.  
As the DPRK receives greater benefits from an increase in intra-Korean relations, the 
theory expects the DPRK to turn towards a relationship based on trade with the potential 
to remove the security threat from the peninsula. 
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Figure 1.   Korea and Japan’s Economic Interdependence 
 
To assist in maintaining its comparative advantage, the ROK restricted imports 
from other countries creating an almost exclusive market for Korean made goods within 
its own borders.  Korea continued on an export-oriented policy throughout the 1980s as 
its GDP grew at an average of 8.4%.113  South Korea continued to protect its markets for 
nearly twenty years after normalizing relations with Japan.  South Korean imports in 
1963 was a meager 15.9% and did not improve until the eighties after the majority of its 
development was over and imports reached a level of 34.4% in 1987, demonstrating the 
advantage of obtaining a large market for industrializing countries.114    
Through present day, the Republic of Korea has shown an increased flexibility 
when dealing with economic growth.  The ROK per capita in 1963 was a meager US$ 
100 prior to the adopting the export orientation plan compared to a 1990 figure of US$ 
5,000, leading many to label its development “the miracle of the Han.”115  South Korea 
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continued to grow at an average rate of nearly 7% through 2002 after opening its 
domestic markets to foreign goods.  South Korea demonstrated its ability to absorb 
external shocks after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 where it recovered with a 
10.7% growth rate following a year of negative growth.116 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The historical paths of each Korean state can be utilized to create goals that each 
state can utilize to help reach unification.  Viewing the “X” year plans that have been 
associated with each state can introduce the North Korean citizens to modern ideas over a 
slow period, damping the shock associated with a rapid absorption.  Using the ROK 
model of self-lead reform, the reforms can conform to the DPRK’s Jueche ideology while 
still falling under the realm of Korean inspired.  This removes the fear of outside nations 
pushing the Korean peninsula towards reforms that places the benefits on foreign nations 
vice the Korean states.  
The ability of South Korea to put aside its past difference with Japan as both 
nations placed economic development first can be a model to allow North Korea to do the 
same with the ROK.  If a normal relationship emerges economically between the two 
Koreas, we can expect the DPRK to be more dependent on the interactions with the ROK 
and keep intra-Korean trade and communication open.  This interdependence can help 
modernize the DPRK economy while creating trust throughout the peninsula, which is 
vital before unification.   
Building off the economic relationship, the ROK will be in a position of great 
influence over the DPRK.  The ROK can use this position to both directly and indirectly 
force the DPRK to adapt goals and principles to assist in unification including the 
continued pressure to halt its nuclear weapons program and dismantle its production 
facilities.  Creating a stable security situation on the peninsula can aid in enabling 
additional travel measures between the two states allowing citizens to exchange ideas and  
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stories of life in each state.  The continued interactions between Korean citizens can help 
create the greater Korean identity needed to remove mental barriers still present after 














IV. THE SCENARIOS FOR UNIFICATION 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter focuses on three different unification scenarios:  1) an internal 
collapse of the DPRK government followed by absorption by the ROK; 2) Establishing a 
Free-Trade Area that includes the DPRK to introduce capitalism into the closed 
economy; 3) Establishment and expansion of Special Economic Zones that introduces 
capitalism into the DPRK under the tutelage of the ROK.  While the first scenario may be 
the least preferred by the international community, it continues to remain a possibility.  
The second and third scenarios provide two alternate paths of reaching the desired end 
state of reducing the economic gap between the two states while creating trust, which can 
lead to unification after continued interactions.  Each economic scenario contains a 
historical example of the selected process achieving the effects needed throughout the 
peninsula.  This chapter concludes with a review of which scenario has the best 
probability of occurring while still achieving the end state of a unified Korean state, free 
of nuclear weapons that take an active role in the international community.   
I weigh each scenario against five variables that can assist in unifying the 
peninsula:  time, financial costs, regional stability, acceptability of the international 
community and building trust.  All variables are measured on a scale of 1 to 3, with 1 
being the most desirable and 3 being the least.  The variable of time is weighed on the 
same scale of 1 to 3, as 1 will represent a fast unification and 3 embodying a long 
process.  While additional variables are present on the peninsula, I focus on these five to 
compare the three different scenarios.  Table 1, below, summarizes my conclusions: 
Table 1.   Comparison of Scenarios  
  Time Financial Cost Regional Stability
Acceptance of the 
Int. Community Trust 
Collapse 1 3 3 3 3 
FTA 3 2 2 2 2 






B. COLLAPSE AND ABSORPTION OF THE DPRK  
While Kim Jung-Il continues to keep the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
an independent state through extensive rent-seeking measures, the potential of a regime 
collapse has not diminished.  A collapse appears to be the most widely accepted 
unification scenario, with an end state similar to Germany in the early nineties.  The 
uncertainty of the health of President Kim with the lack of an apparent successor adds to 
the likelihood of a collapse and keeps the possibility of this scenario high.   
A collapse of the DPRK will bring a tremendous shock to the world economy 
larger than the events following the downfall of East Germany.  When Germany, a nation 
also affected by a division during the Cold War reunited in 1990, the difficulty of 
merging two different economies became visible.  The West German expenses between 
1991 and 2004 are over $1.4 trillion to bring the two different economic states 
together.117  Germany saw unemployment rise to 40% while downsizing the East German 
military, incorporating two societies while trying to raise the standard of living for all 
German citizens.118  Although some of the German problems were unforeseen and 
unavoidable during its unification, Germany’s experience can be used as a roadmap for 
the potential Korean unification while incorporating additional unforeseen problems. 
While this scenario will be the fastest road to unification, it ranks low in the other 
variables of the matrix.  The financial cost associated with unifying the Korean peninsula 
will dwarf that of Germany.  Prior to the German unification, the smaller state’s level of 
income was about 25% of the larger state; this is in sharp contrast to the 6% ratio on the  
Korean peninsula.119  The ratio of population difference is almost twice as large on the 
Korean peninsula as it was within Germany in the nineties pushing unification costs 
higher.      
                                                 
117  Charles Wolf  Jr. and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs and 
Consequences of Korean Unification (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corp., 2005), 71.  
118 Kang Suk Rhee, “Korea’s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience,” Asian Survey 
33, no. 4 (1993), 371. 
119 Charles Wolf Jr. and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs and 




The collapse of the DPRK would cause widespread panic and national 
adjustments throughout the region as the nations would be urged to provide relief through 
both personnel and monetary support.120  Without a solid handle on the economy of the 
DPRK, the cost of merging the Korean peninsula following an internal collapse have 
been estimated on the low end of $100 billion dollars121 and $1 trillion dollars122 at the 
high end.  The longer the two economies continue down separate paths, increasing the 
economic gap between the two states, the costs of unification will continue to increase.  
In terms of personnel, estimates call for over 460,000 military troops to maintain order 
within the DPRK if a collapse were to occur.123  We can expect additional personnel 
including NGOs and advisors to assist in rebuilding the nation on top of the military force 
required to maintain law.      
During the unification of Germany, a massive influx of East Germans made their 
way into West Germany looking for a new start.  The same pattern should be expected 
during this scenario and must be planned for accordingly.  Using elements already 
present on the Korean peninsula and enacting additional measures, a large migration can 
be minimized.  Removing barriers during Germany’s unification only made the migration 
problem worse allowing Korea to learn a valuable lesson as plans for unification evolve.  
Maintaining the current boundaries of the DMZ will ease the amount of refugee that may 
flow south in search of a better life.124  Establishing camps that administer food and 
medicinal aid on the northern sector of the DMZ may help keep North Korean citizens 
from venturing further south.  Along with aid, educational materials should be available 
to warn any refugee about the potential hazards associated with continuing their journey  
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south including the presence of unexploded ordinance and land mines.  The same camps 
can be established at the northern border with China and Russia to minimize refugee 
flows north.       
In addition to stopping refugees, the amount of health care that must be 
administered to the citizens of the DPRK posses another problem.  To minimize cost and 
migration, a short-term solution providing basis health care should be established until 
the focus is able to shift toward rebuilding the economy of North Korea.125  When the 
new Korean nation establishes security and starts to bring income and wealth into the 
territory that was once North Korea, a new plan can be drafted to ensure the long-term 
health benefits are available to its citizens.  
Simultaneously away from the borders, efforts must be made in the populated 
areas of North Korea to raise the standard of living and encourage citizens to remain in 
these areas rather than risk migrating elsewhere.126  Reducing the effects of migration 
will allow additional supplies and support to travel further north into the former DPRK 
territory assisting in establishing order.  Rebuilding a nation cannot occur until basic 
needs, including health care and security, are met allowing the citizens to become a part 
of the process.   
The military sector of North Korea constitutes another challenge due to its 
immense size.  Over a million households could be affected if this force were to dissolve 
and remove these families income.  As seen in Iraq, demobilizing an army increases 
unemployment and creates a pool of trained professionals that can decrease the security 
environment and hindering unification.  Diplomatic engagement of the military sector is 
vital to ensure a smooth unification process occurs.     
The military, which compromises some of the most educated and healthy North 
Korean citizens, can be utilized to maintain security in the north while transforming the 
states’ philosophy of Jueche.  In order for this to occur, the South Korean military must 
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absorb the leadership of the North Korean military and issue orders down to the lowest 
branches of the military.  This concept will only occur if the North Korean military is 
treated equally and external nations remove their military forces from the area that was 
once North Korea and focus on the border areas.  The downsizing of the military should 
only occur after security is maintained and alternative careers are available. 
While the bulk of responsibility for assisting the DPRK after a collapse will fall 
on the ROK, they will not be the only nation involved either directly or indirectly.  The 
United States and Japan can be expected to act along historical lines providing assistance 
as needed.  Neighboring nations will seek to create a stable Korean peninsula to ensure 
security for their future while creating a favorable area for investments.  The IMF and 
World Bank can be expected to give South Korea grants and loans to keep the new nation 
from falling into a recession, which they may not be able to overcome.  These nations and 
institutions will help ease the transition to a unified Korean nation that will be self-
sufficient and can provide aid to developing nations in the future    
The nations of South Korea, Japan, China and the United States wish to avoid this 
scenario and pursue other options due to the sheer costs and potential security uncertainty 
that accompanies a collapse of the DPRK.  Many of these nations currently provide 
humanitarian aid to help the citizens of North Korea without an end state of building trust 
or unifying the peninsula.127  A unified Korean peninsula through this scenario may 
experience years of internal fighting as former Kim supporters, revolutionaries, political 
moderates and counter-revolutionaries could form an insurgency creating security issues 
that must be overcome before a unified nation emerges.       
A collapse of the DPRK could also create a new political battleground as the 
United States, ROK, Japan, PRC and Soviet Union wrestle for influence over the new 
nation.  While these nations are currently involved in the six-party talks and possess the 
same goal of a denuclearized peninsula, quickly removing the nuclear variable can 
disintegrate the trust among the regional powers built during this process.  These nations  
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have historically clashed both militarily and politically over the future of the peninsula 
including recently with the notion of placing embargoes on the DPRK through the United 
Nations.   
While the scenario of a DPRK collapse will always be an option, it contains 
numerous problems that can arise making it the scenario the international community 
wishes to avoid.  The speed is acceptable but at the expense of regional stability and 
financial cost.  It provides no basis to create trust either between the two Korean states or 
through the regional players that will be involved.  While it is undesirable for all nations 
involved, it still must be used to plan for the future of the Korean peninsula as this 
scenario’s probably remains likely. 
C.  FREE TRADE AREA 
The second scenario for unification involves a slow opening of the DPRK to the 
outside world using a Free Trade Area on the peninsula with the potential to grow and 
encompass additional nations.  The possibility of a free trade area in Northeast Asia has 
immense benefits to a nation like the DPRK as its products can find additional markets 
while being priced below those products manufactured in more developed nations.  
Historically, a free trade agreement favors the smaller country while the more advanced 
country/countries experiences minimal gains.128  Two large free trade zones have been 
mentioned as a model for this concept; the North American Free Trade Agreement 
encompassing the three countries making up North America and the European Union that 
continues to take smaller countries into its membership.  I will briefly explain how 
NAFTA help spur FDI into North America as well as some of the fallbacks before 
examining how this scenario may play out on the Korean Peninsula.     
1.   NAFTA  
Examining the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), we can see how 
different economies can benefit from such an agreement while interlocking their 
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economies and expanding the benefits throughout the region.  NAFTA went into effect 
on January 1, 1994 incorporating the three nations of North America:  the United States, 
Canada and Mexico.129  It immediately linked the three nation’s economies, bringing the 
capital rich economies of the United States and Canada with the labor abundant economy 
of Mexico.130  Each nation received a substantial benefit from the treaty as trade 
increased.      
The treaty brought an increase in FDI into the region, as it became a stable area 
for investments.  The treaty brought in two different forms of investors, those who sought 
markets and those who sought resources.131  The companies wishing to seek resources 
placed their investments into Mexico while Canada and the United States received 
investments from the companies seeking markets.  Many corporations already operating 
inside the United States were now able to view Canada as a different market as they 
exported products north without tariffs allowing them to reduce their prices and increase 
profits.132  Many corporations grew stronger as they could now produce products at a 
lower cost thanks to the abundance of labor in Mexico while the market increased 
including all three nations.      
An agreement similar to NAFTA has the ability to reform a nation’s economic 
policy as the larger nation(s) transfer ideas and technology that normally would not flow 
into the smaller nation.133  NAFTA ensured trade between the three nations remained 
high as the world continued down a path of globalization while Canada remained the 
United States largest trading partner and Mexico moved into the second place position.134  
The relationship between these nations allowed Mexico to liberalize its economic policies 
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as they began to close the gap between itself and the NAFTA members.135  The 
interdependence between the three nations increased while many sought to increase the 
FTA to South American nations currently holding only bilateral agreements with the 
NAFTA nations.136  The continued investments both into and out of the United States 
have created an era of competitiveness throughout the Western hemisphere that benefits 
all nations.     
However, this plan also had it setbacks.  Many businesses closed, as they could 
not remain competitive with the larger firms as they benefited from the increase in trade 
activity.137  As tariff barriers fell and United States farmers exported corn into Mexico, 
the price of corn decreased forcing Mexican farmers to lay off workers, as they could not 
remain competitive.  Many workers of the agricultural sector of Mexico migrated north 
into the United States searching for employment opportunities.138  The migration 
problem may continue for a generation before the education level and job opportunities 
between the partner nations equalize.139  The short-term pain of businesses going 
bankrupt and the unemployment it causes have to be endured before the economic sectors 
stabilize allowing a nation to achieve its full potential.   
2.   Incorporating the Korean Peninsula 
Through the region of East Asia, economic integration has already begun.  
Comparing trade from 1980 through 2007, intraregional trade has increased 22% as FDI 
continues to rise.140  The increase in trade is proportional to investments as the majority 
of investments come from industrialized countries towards those developing.  Creating a 
FTA between the two Korean states can help guide the development of North Korea to 
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ensure its model of development continues to grow and does not stagnate.141  Limiting 
the FTA to the Korean peninsula will allow South Korea to control the interdependence 
level of the DPRK making it easier to set reforms within its borders.142  Marking reforms 
while liberalizing the North Korean economy can set a foundation to build towards a 
reunified peninsula.   
In order for this scenario to occur, the nations in the region must pursue open 
economic talks aimed at introducing capitalism to the DPRK.  South Korea can act as a 
gateway to introduce these new polices from a Korean perspective to avoid violating the 
North Korean Jueche philosophy.  The current framework of the Six-Party talks can be 
molded to incorporate economic interests throughout the region similar to NAFTA.  
While these talks currently do not involve the possibility of unification, they have 
established a link between the countries of the region that did not previously exist.   
An agreement similar to that of the North American Free Trade Agreement will 
produce two functions; help bridge the gap in economic productivity and continue to 
build trust throughout the region thus reducing instability.  The possibility of a free trade 
agreement originating between the two Korean states and further expanding to 
neighboring countries increases the economic market for DPRK goods while providing 
the government with a new source of income.143  While the DPRK has the most to gain 
economically from a FTA, the ROK will favor increasing its security while providing 
inexpensive products to its citizens.  While ROK’s economic benefit will not be as large, 
the increase in security would be suitable to pursue this option.144  As the interactions 
between the two Korean states are increased and become more dependable, common 
goals for each state can start to develop.       
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While products may initially be the only items exchanged over the 38th parallel in 
a FTA, the possibility for capital and technology to flow into the DPRK is also present.  
Along with the physical aspects including capital and technology, the DPRK may also 
adopt managerial skills and labor reforms from the businesses in South Korea similar to 
Mexico within NAFTA.145  The words of William Langdon from 1942 again ring true:  
“…For a generation at least Korea would have to be protected, guided and aided to 
modern statehood…” as internal DPRK reforms have failed to reached their desired 
effects.146 
Over 86% of the Korean population was born after the division of the 
peninsula.147  The large percentage of a young population within North Korean enhances 
its ability to learn and adapt to new ideas and reforms.148  This younger generation 
already experience capitalist ideas one a low level through their interactions with the 
emerging markets in the urban areas of the DPRK.  We can expect the young population 
to rise to the level of managers and leaders of industries as they have a foundation in 
capitalist principles.  The process of the FTA will be bumpy, as the DPRK will have to 
adapt rapidly to a new environment without a mentor guiding its development.  However, 
as the younger citizens observe new economic policies within a new system, they may 
continue to pursue a capitalist economic model moving the nation’s economy closer to 
that of the ROK becoming the next generation of managers and leaders. 
As these two states continue to increase trade over time, they will also reduce the 
security tensions as their economic interdependence increase.  If the FTA becomes a 
success, neighboring countries can join the agreement increasing the interdependence of 
the Korean peninsula throughout the region.  This would not be the first occurrence of a 
proposed FTA in the region as China brought the possibility to both Japan and South 
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Korea in the past.149  Currently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is located 
throughout central Asia incorporating both the PRC and Russia as members.150  While 
the SCO is mainly concerned with terrorism and cross border support for insurgencies in 
Central Asia, it may help bring peace to the peninsula if both Korean states become 
members creating another venue to voice concerns while they build trust working 
together.  The United States should not be a direct participant of a FTA with the DPRK 
due to the mistrust developed between these two nations in the last fifty years.  However, 
they can still benefit from such an arrangement through its continued interactions with 
the South Korean and Japanese markets.   
This scenario may take the longest time to achieve the goal of unification, as the 
DPRK’s economy will continue to grow closing the current level of economic disparity 
between the two Korean states.  The highest factor in establishing a FTA that meets the 
objectives is the removal of the security threat of the peninsula.  The continued 
interactions between the two Korean states can increase regional security, as the DPRK 
will have a larger incentive to focus on economic cooperation rather than policies that can 
be seen as aggressive.  If the DPRK decides to halt its current military posture, the length 
of unification will no longer serve as a priority for ensuring a smooth transition.  A form 
of detente will emerge as the two states move towards a similar set of goals.     
The cooperation of the two Korean states towards these goals will build trust.  
However, the potential for the DPRK to remain a separate state with a new source of 
income remains likely.  If the relationship between the two Korean states become 
normalized, the issue of unification will be decreased and provide time to work through 
the numerous issues that are currently in place.  The international community will be  
supportive of a FTA, but only after the DPRK government acts in a responsible fashion 
that demonstrate it will not default on loans, continue to hold large trade imbalances or 
advance its nuclear weapon program.   
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The more nations involved in the FTA can create separate paths for the DPRK to 
continue its economic growth while maintaining the ability to coexist peacefully with the 
ROK.  This may remove incentives for the DPRK to focus on common goals to lead to a 
unified peninsula and continue down a path of self-reliance.  The possibility to continue 
to trade with the international community while advancing its nuclear weapons program 
can make an FTA disadvantageous to the goals of increasing security and unifying the 
Korean peninsula.  Mitigating this possibility may occur through establishing a small 
FTA that only involves the Korean states allowing the ROK to push towards 
denuclearization and unification.  However, South Korea would not be able to keep the 
DPRK from signing additional FTA with outside nations creating different paths of 
economic development and maintaining the status of two Korean states.         
D. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
The final scenario is the establishment and expansion of special economic zones, 
similar to those that were successful in opening China’s economy to the world, within the 
DPRK under the guidance of the ROK.  Like the second scenario, this method will be 
long and possibly take generations, but has a higher potential for unification.  Again, the 
cost to the international community will be minimal making it more appealing, with the 
potential to build trust and increase the security throughout the peninsula.  I will first 
examine how SEZs helped spur economic growth within China between 1984 and 1994 
before showing how it can be applied towards North Korea.   
1.   Chinese SEZs  
The PRC experienced a rapid decline of annual GDP followed by a period of 
inconsistent growth, culminating with negative growth in 1976.151  The unexpected 
economic roller coaster paved the way for Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy in 1978.  
This policy replaced the importance of communist ideology with economic growth as the 
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state’s policy in an effort to solidify the party’s rule over the China.152  This dramatic 
shift was possible due to the economic exhaustion felt throughout the Chinese 
leadership.153  Figure 3 demonstrates the dramatic decrease in GDP growth during the 
early seventies of China followed by the subsequent growth from the mid eighties for 
approximately ten years using SEZs before party leaders implemented additional 
economic reforms to maintain their growth around ten percent.   
    
 
 
Figure 2.   GDP Growth Rate for the PRC from 1970-2007 
 
The establishments of SEZs in various isolated areas become “a window for 
technology, for knowledge, for managerial expertise and for China’s foreign policy” 
helping to launch the open door policy.154  The leadership of the CCP understood they 
were falling behind the rest of the world in economic power and decided to inject a boost 
into the industrial sectors by creating SEZs.  These zones became an arena for gaining 
additional knowledge through technology and western business practices while creating 
an influx of foreign investment all the while keeping the capitalist footprint small.155  
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However, within the leadership of the CCP, a debate occurred over the establishment of 
these zones including where they would be located and how they would operate.156  One 
can conclude the same debate is currently taking place within the Kim administration in 
Pyongyang after viewing statements published in the DPRK news after Kim’s visit to the 
Chinese SEZs.  In addition to providing much needed capital and technology, these zones 
provided the CCP with a secluded area to test reforms without the fear of failure 
associated with introducing them to the nation as a whole. 
The catalyst behind the development of the SEZs rested on foreign investment 
while granting autonomy for international business practices within each zone.157  
President Deng made his intentions clear to potential investors in these zones by stating 
“in establishing special zones and carrying out the open policy, we must be clear about 
the guiding thought which is not to restrict but to open wider” showing his commitment 
to build and expand these zones.158  The zones were able to attract vast amounts of 
investments from companies without ties to China in their initial offerings.  The SEZ 
brought in 60% of China’s national foreign investments in 1981 and continued to 
constitute 26% of China’s investments in 1984.159      
The SEZs pooled western industrial technology with the natural resources and 
abundant labor in China creating greater profits for the investors while increasing the 
standard of living for the area’s population as the economy continued to grow.  The initial 
investments went towards building infrastructure projects for the first 5 years creating an 
industrial base within each SEZ.  The investments later went to techniques and equipment 
that made manufacturing more efficient as a more export-oriented strategy was adopted, 
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allowing the SEZs to expand.160  This change in resource allocation brought added 
profits to each company as the activity within each zone increased along with the influx 
of more foreign investment. 
Chinese SEZs originally relied on external components to construct a finish 
project, but within 15 years, they had the ability to produce a finished product from the 
resources within or surrounding each zone.  By mid 1990’s, the ability of the zones to 
produce a computer from start to finish without external inputs was achieved, reducing 
the overhead costs leading to larger profits for the companies involved.161  The ability to 
become self-reliant can be utilized to allow SEZs within the DPRK to expand while still 
under the guise of the Jueche ideology.   
The Chinese SEZs also became a testing ground for political polices to allow the 
CCP to determine if they would be effective for the entire nation.  The Guangdong SEZ 
gave birth to the idea of job specific wage rates.162  Likewise, the Shenzhen SEZ created 
a policy to allow different companies to compete for various construction projects while 
allowing businesses outside of the SEZ to participate in the process.163  The success of 
these reforms within the SEZs allowed the CCP to implement these reforms in other areas 
of the nation without the fear of failure or the Party losing its power over the nation.  
These zones were buffer areas for the introduction of foreign ideas to China while 
keeping capitalist ideas restricted to the region of southeast China.164  These ideas were 
able to flow to neighboring provinces, as they became part of the supply lines as 
production increased in each SEZ.  The interactions between the neighboring provinces 
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and the SEZs were beneficial to all China, as it became the cornerstone of China’s 
developmental plan.165  The design of these zones included a premise for potential future  
unification.  The PRC allowed different economic ideas to flourish in areas close to 
territories that would eventually fall under its sovereignty including Hong Kong and 
Macao.166       
While the SEZs were successful and allowed China to sustain double-digit GDP 
growth between 1983 and 1994, the PRC also possessed obstacles that had to be 
overcome.  Prior to the SEZs, China lacked a large pool of capable managers able to 
oversee new projects.  They also did not posses the personal capable of coordinating 
activities between the various departments located within each SEZ.  These two labor 
pools ands their associated staff were created through on the job training from the various 
companies who invested within the SEZs.167   
Each SEZ also had problems generating enough electricity to continue production 
on a regular basis.  The amount of energy needed to keep some SEZs open continuously 
cost more than the profits coming in from the operation of the SEZ.  The central 
government issued subsidies to gap the negative cost and allowed the SEZ to grow to a 
size where the profits could cover the associated costs.  The party accepted these costs in 
order to keep the SEZs and the associated capitalist principles away from populated 
areas, which could have maintained the electrical load, while ensuring the party’s control 
over the SEZs development.168           
Some areas incurred problems with railroad connections, making the 
transportation of materials and finished good difficult.169  This slowed the production of 
goods until enough capital was available to construct the necessary infrastructure for a 
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bustling industrial area.  The Chinese SEZs were able to overcome these issues while 
catapulting the growth of China in the scope of one generation to a regional power.  
China’s rise has been unparalleled to any country currently on the international scene, 
allowing them to compete with the industrialized nations of Europe and the United States. 
In addition to economic benefits, these zones brought additional security.  The 
area of Xiamen, located across the strait from the province of Taiwan, was once a 
military outpost used to launch artillery attacks into Taiwan.  However, since it converted 
into a SEZ in the early eighties, it has transformed into a bustling financial management 
center.  A large influx of indirect Taiwanese capital and management techniques helped 
the SEZ to flourish despite the two areas historical disputes.  New legislation proposed by 
both the PRC and Taiwan may increase the interaction between the two areas while 
dampening the past security issues.170 
2.   North Korean SEZs 
The possibility of establishing special economic zones (SEZ) within North Korea 
has been debated within North Korea since the success of SEZs in China.  However, it 
was not until 1990 when a member of the North Korean elite, Yon Hyung Muk, visited 
the Chinese SEZ of Shenzhen and witnessed its success. 171  He brought the idea back 
into the DPRK for consideration.  Further support for SEZ occurred in 2000 when 
President Kim Jung-Il praised the economic reforms made by the Chinese government 
after a visit to China.172  However, shortly after Kim Jung-Il’s visit, two state-owned 
North Korea publications printed an article stating the conflict between SEZ and the 
Jueche philosophy: 
If one wants the prosperity of the national economy, he should thoroughly 
reject the idea of dependence on outside forces, the idea that he cannot live 
without foreign capital…We must heighten vigilance against the 
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imperialists’ moves to induce us to “reform” and “opening to the outside 
world.”  “Reform” and “opening” on their lips are a honey-coated poison.  
Clear is our stand toward “reform” and “opening.”  We now have nothing 
to “reform” and “open.”  By “reform” and “opening” the imperialists 
mean a revival of capitalism.  The best way of blocking the wind of  
“reform” and “opening” of the imperialist is to defend the socialist 
principle in all sectors of the economy…We will never abandon the 
principle, but will set ourselves against all attempts to induce us to join an 
“integrated” world.173           
As the debate continued within the DPRK government, the failed economic reforms of 
2002 left the DPRK leadership with little alternatives to keep the state from failing.  
Building upon the sometimes-rocky relationship of the two Koreas, a foundation was set 
for the creation of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC).   
In 2003, the construction of the KIC began with large investments from South 
Korean companies.174  The ROK was able to take advantage of the abundance of North 
Korean labor, which is roughly one-third the cost of factory workers within the PRC, 
keeping its products competitive on the international market.  The DPRK’s government 
has benefited from the KIC by collecting taxes from both the employees and the 
companies working within the complex.  The North Korean government has stopped all 
proposals for bonuses or incentive pay for workers and have funneled all payments to the 
central government first, ensuring all taxes are collected.175        
The KIC, labeled a “Free Market Concentration Camp,” is used by the regime to 
limit the exposure of capitalism in the state with a fenced buffer zone around the 
complex.176  While a strong communist footprint still exists within the zone, the workers 
are slowly introduced to capitalism as praise continues for the South Korean supervisors.  
The difference in physical appearance between the South Korean managers and the North 
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Korean workers demonstrates the advantages of the southern capitalist economy over the  
current DPRK economy.  It is assumed these differences are discussed out of the complex 
between the workers and their close family and friends when government representatives 
are not present.      
The Republic of Korea views the KIC as a first step towards unification.  They 
see the complex as a way to “encourage improved inter-Korean relations and accelerate 
the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula.”177  This complex is the largest project 
completed inside the DPRK since its initial planned development following the Korean 
War.  Through the KIC, both Korean governments have chosen to cooperate as economic 
growth increases while creating an atmosphere of trust, which has previously been absent 
in their relationship.  As the complex expands and the investment climate of North Korea 
stabilizes, we will see additional South Korean companies wishing to invest in the 
DPRK.   
Although this possibility will take a substantial amount of time, it has the best 
chance of leading to unification without the use of force and without a large influx of aid 
from the international community.  The benefits of the KIC are already seen as the two 
states agreed on 11 additional joint economic projects within North Korea outside of the 
KIC in 2004.178  Figure 2 shows the steady increase in economic adventures within the 
DPRK since 2001.  This figure shows the potential for future trade remains high, the 
variable absent in Dale Copeland’s explanation for the outbreak of major conflict in 
Europe and the Pacific in the first half of the 20th Century.  This variable may lead North 
Korea down a path of more cooperation as it continues to reap the benefits of additional 
economic integration with the south.      
The willingness of the people of the DPRK to accept special economic zones and 
reference them in the constitution demonstrates the potential acceptance of increasing 
upon the KIC and opening other SEZs.  The lack of fuel and spare parts throughout North 
Korea in the nineties contributed to its lack of growth without an alternate source besides 
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inputs from the USSR.  Yet, the ability of South Korea to supply these needed variables 
in addition to foreign capital through SEZs creates an atmosphere that can go beyond 
simple economic benefits and places leverage in the hands of the ROK government.179    
 
 
Figure 3.   Economic Cooperation Partner/Project Approval   
 
An increase in economic interdependence throughout the region can make the 
once hostile area into an economic center, unchallenged throughout the international 
community.  The increased intra-Korean economic relations not only helps to build a 
foundation for peace but also helps to decrease the cultural shock that would be present in 
a collapse while the two states work towards common goals.180  The application of the 
KIC towards additional zones with a focus towards Korea’s neighbors can create 
additional successful SEZs.  The geographic proximately of Japan, the PRC and the 
Soviet Union toward the DPRK holds tremendous potential for future zones, which can 
help bring the two Korean economies closer creating a smoother transition to a single 
nation.  Incorporating neighboring nations will allow their economies to grow, increasing 
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the acceptance of this scenario from the international community.  Care must be given to 
ensure these nations understand the end state of unification and cooperate with the  ROK 
when pressure must be applied to the DPRK.         
While reducing the cost for unification, this scenario also creates trust throughout 
the region that will not be hastily removed.  Incorporating the nations of the region 
through different zones can reduce current hostilities while dampening any battle for 
influence on the peninsula, which would be apparent following a collapse of the DPRK.  
This scenario has the best possibly of occurring as both Korean states already took the 
first step down this path with the creation of the KIC.  The KIC does not guarantee 
unification will occur but the added pressures that can be applied by the ROK towards the 
government of the DPRK can help set the stage for the reemergence of a unified Korean 
nation. 
E. FREE TRADE AREA VS SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 
The FTA and SEZ scenarios both hold the potential to map the future of the 
Korean peninsula towards a unified nation.  The main goal of each scenario is the same, 
reducing the disproportional living conditions and economic conditions between the two 
Korean states through a process that causes the lowest financial burden to the 
international community.  Some analysts believe the foundation laid through 
strengthened business ties are irreversible and will lead to unification.181  Reaching 
unification appears possible through both scenarios with the SEZ obtaining a slight 
advantage, as the ROK continues to invest in infrastructure targeted at reaching the end 
state of unification.   
The period for each scenario remains consistent between the two.  Whatever path 
occurs, we can expect unification to take at least one generation, as building trust on the 
peninsula will not be an easy task.  The increased economic ties helps lead to a more 
trusting  relationship  as the  nations  become  increasingly  dependent  on  the  other   for  
 
                                                 





peaceful coexistence.  The economic interdependence theory tells us that states with 
intertwined economies will be more open to ensure both states receive the greatest benefit 
from the relationship.   
The international community is primarily concerned with regional stability, or 
lack thereof, that spirals from the Korean peninsula.  These two scenarios both contain 
the potential to help increase security through the region as intra-Korean tensions 
decrease through increased economic interactions.  The possible expansion of these 
scenarios to include regional nations increases the acceptance of the international 
community, particularly the regional nations.  The incorporation of neighbors has the 
possibility to increase the security of the region further as all parties will continue to 
benefit as trading nations vice committing hostile actions.   
These factors appear to keep both scenarios fairly even, but the SEZ scenario 
holds three distinct advantages over the FTA:  the probability of it occurring, the 
influence the ROK holds over the DPRK in a SEZ and the ability to connect the two 
economies without a third party.  The possibility of a FTA occurring within Northeast 
Asia, while high, has yet to transpire.  Creating an agreement between two states that 
historically have broken written treaties and committed crimes against the other continues 
to be a roadblock to future endeavors.  The lack of oversight inside the borders of the 
DPRK allows them to conduct business that may be good for short-term growth but fails 
to achieve the long-term growth needed.  The current projects scheduled for construction 
within North Korea come with the caveat of heavy South Korean oversight to ensure the 
projects will serve long-term interests.   
The second advantage the SEZ holds over a FTA is the control the ROK has over 
the DPRK.  The ROK has been able to flourish economically over the past 50 plus years 
without implementing SEZs inside North Korea.  The same cannot be said of the DPRK, 
who becomes more dependent on the businesses associated with the operation of the KIC.  
This gives the ROK the ability to place milestones into future agreements, which can 
make progress to eliminate the north’s nuclear weapons program.  Additional caveats can 
be placed into future economic accords that can bring the two Korean states closer as the 




The last advantage is the ability of the SEZs to develop a deep economic 
interdependence between the two Korean states without a third nation developing the 
same relationship with North Korea.  Removing the ability of additional nations 
interacting with the DPRK removes the potential for it to lean towards other nations and 
discourage unification.  The ability of the ROK to influence future decisions by the ROK 
help place the SEZ scenario above that of the FTA.     
F.  CONCLUSION 
The best scenario involves continuing the interaction between North and South 
Korea through the expansion of SEZs in order to build trust and expand upon the small 
portion of capitalism currently in the isolated state of the DPRK.  The success of China’s 
SEZs since the 1980s can be used as an additional incentive to persuade North Korea to 
continue down this path while installing new policies, which can be applied towards 
unification.  Through the successful use of capitalist fundamentals and cooperation with 
the South Korean businesses and government through the SEZ, the political elite of the 
DPRK can shift the focus of North Korean life away from a stringent philosophy of 
Jueche and towards an era of cooperation with the ROK. 
 Economic engagement can keep the two Korean states to continue down the path 
of cooperation while continuing to intertwine their economies.  We can expect this 
relationship to grow similar to that of Japan and South Korea since 1965 while laying a 
foundation that removes invisible barriers between the two nations including an 
expansion in travel between to the two states.  These actions will decrease security 
tensions as explained by the theory of economic interdependence while allowing the two 
states to work towards common goals.  The first step in unification involves removing the 
invisible barriers and creating a single Korean identity that will allow the physical 











This chapter focuses on how the DPRK can achieve similar results as China using 
a template similar to the Chinese SEZs.  I examine the current SEZ within North Korea 
and the success achieved on this small scale as well as the additional benefits its has 
brought to the peninsula.  I conclude with why I believe this is the best approach to 
engage North Korea that can lead to an end state of a unified Korean nation.       
B. APPLICATION TOWARDS NORTH KOREA 
The same issues that affected Deng Xiaoping’s China in 1978 are visible today 
within North Korea.  The debate within the government about the correct direction to 
take the state, the economic stagnation and frustration, a society closed off from the 
international community and the desire of the surrounding nations to invest within its 
borders.  Using the third scenario of expanding SEZs within North Korean borders, 
similar to what occurred in China during the early eighties, brings tremendous benefits 
that assists with unification efforts on a parallel path.   
The first successful SEZ within the DPRK is already established in the city of 
Kaesong.  The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) consists of over 15 South Korean 
companies selected from a pool of 136 companies that submitted proposals to the ROK 
government for the right to operated within the KIC.182  The complex began with a $2 
million investment from South Korea, a pool of 6,000 North Korean workers and 500 
South Korean managers.  The amount of South Korean workers has doubled to over 
1,000 as the complex continues to expand incorporating additional FDI received from the 
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companies operating inside the complex.183  The first years of operation also saw the 
number of North Korean workers increased to 15,000, with plans to employ over 500,000 
workers by the year 2012.184  Yet, the complex is still relatively closed off to the citizens 
of North Korea with a fence maintaining a five-mile buffer zone around its perimeter.185   
With the additional capital flowing into the DPRK economy through the KIC, the 
government can invest in infrastructure and construct additional industrial complexes to 
garner additional foreign capital with the help from its southern neighbor allowing the 
South Korean companies with a desire to invest in the north the opportunity to use the 
resource of cheap labor.  The DPRK can move the more established North Korean 
workers from the KIC to future complexes and assume the role of managers while 
creating additional areas of wealth and prosperity throughout the state while spreading 
free markets ideas.  As North Korean executives and government officials continue to 
deal with the international community, the distrust of commonly associated with foreign 
nations will dissolve.  Establishing a feeling of trust using South Korean economic 
advisors and spreading the capitalist ideology throughout the DPRK will lay a foundation 
that builds trust and allows both economies to merge forming a nation that can become an 
international economic powerhouse.      
C. THE SUCCESS OF THE KAESONG INDUSTRIAL ZONE 
The South Korean Ministry of Unification has placed an added emphasis on 
economic cooperation in its quest for stability and unification on the Korean Peninsula.  
The vision for unification released by the Lee Myung-bak administration created three 
goals to assist in the process:  1) build military trust between both states, 2) develop the 
economy of North Korea in a way that is beneficial to both states, 3) to raise the quality 
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of life for all Korean citizens.186  I will focus this section on the development of the 
North Korean economy through the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a program proven 
beneficial to both states and continuing to grow.      
The planned construction of the zone entails three phases over 10 years, allowing 
companies to produce goods while the zone expands.187  Since its inception, the KIC has 
increased the amount of companies operating within the zone and as well as the products 
being produced.  The basic principle behind the zone pairs the cheap labor available 
within North Korea to the managerial skills and technology from South Korean 
companies, similar to the SEZs of China.  Creating an atmosphere similar to the South 
Korean/Japanese normalization of 1965, the South Korean government hopes to increase 
the living standards of all Korean citizens while pursuing an interdependent relationship 
beyond simple international institutions with North Korea.  The trade between the two 
Korean states has totaled over US$ 9 billion between 1989 and 2007.  The majority of 
this trade occurred between the years 2005 and 2007, US$ 4.5 billion, directly correlating 
to the construction of the KIC and its first two years of operation.188  (See Table 2)  
Alternative methods of communication between the KIC and South Korea emerged as the 
amount of telecommunications equipment within the complex has doubled while 
connecting the KIC to the South Korean power grid in May 2007, providing an 
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Table 2.   A Brief Exchange of Goods189 
Exchanges of Goods between  
the ROK and the DPRK 
Year Total KIC 
2005 US$ 1.05 Billion US$ 14.9 Million 
2006 US$ 1.35 Billion US$ 73.7 Million 
2007 US$ 1.79 Billion US$ 184.7 Million 
2008* US$ 88.79 Billion US$ 80 Million 
* Data for the first six months of 2008 
 
While creating wealth inside North Korea, the complex also allows South Korean 
companies to stay competitive on the international markets as they minimize production 
costs.  This fact achieves the third goal of the President Lee administration’s actions 
toward North Korea, being beneficial to both states while raising the standard of living 
for all Korean citizens.  The potential for future trade remains high, as the transfer of 
goods across the DMZ continues to grow since 1993 adhering to David Copeland’s 
emphasis on future trade for a successful economic interdependent relationship.   
D. THE COOPERATION FROM THE KIC 
The KIC has slowly opened the North Korean leadership to assistance from an 
outside nation while working inside its Jueche ideology.  Expanding upon the concept of 
the KIC to other areas with oversight by the ROK can increase its leverage while 
increasing economic gains for both states.  These zones could also serve as a testing 
ground for new governmental policies similar to the path the PRC took with its own 
SEZs.  These zones allow the DPRK government to continue to work on reforms without 
causing widespread failure, which can stall the economic development within the state.  
The close ties present between the DPRK and the ROK since the Sunshine Policy has 
helped new business policies to penetrate the KIC as the goal of economic development 
continues on both sides of the 38th parallel.     
The security tensions between the DPRK and its surrounding neighbors can be 
minimized, if not removed completely, after new sources of income are available to the 
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DPRK leadership.  The new source of capital can assist in removing the need for nuclear 
weapons on the peninsula, creating a situation similar to that of Taiwan and the Chinese 
SEZ of Xiamen, where the threat of military force has diminished.  The larger the 
interdependence between the DPRK and the ROK using SEZs, the more incentives the 
DPRK will have to remove its nuclear program and cooperate as a trading nation.       
Some of the problems experienced during the Chinese SEZs and early DPRK 
SEZs were resolved within the KIC.  The electrical production of the DPRK was 
insufficient to handle the current or future needs of the KIC, so the ROK connected the 
complex to the South Korean electrical grid, ensuring a steady supply of energy was 
available for the production of goods.  The ROK also constructed and repaired numerous 
roads and railroads, enabling the transportation of finished goods to the South Korean 
markets for sale.  These two necessities appear to come from the problems encountered 
by the Chinese SEZs during its quest for economic modernization and have proven 
successful for the KIC. 
Once investment conditions are stable within the DPRK, additional zone 
construction can begin to include other nations with historical ties to North Korea, 
including the PRC and Russia.  The ROK must continue to work with any additional 
nation who chooses to open SEZs within the DPRK as it strives towards the goal of 
national unification.  These nations will not only bring additional capital but new ideas 
and policies into the closed society that can keep the DPRK economy growing.  Allowing 
these historical allied nations into the DPRK borders is the foot in the door necessary for 
the rest of the international community to break into this untapped resource including 
businesses from Taiwan, Japan and various Southeast Asian nations searching for cheap 
labor. 
E.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
While both Korean states were roughly at the same level of economic 
development after the Second World War, the ROK was able to use aggressive policies 
both internally and externally of the state to generate immense economic growth.  The 




was able to modernize in 14 years.  The average annual growth rate during North Korea’s 
industrialized period from 1957 through 1971 was 19.1%.190  Many of the same variables 
located within the DPRK following the Korean War are present today.  An aging 
infrastructure, an abundance of labor and the desire of outside nations to assist should be 
utilized to propel the DPRK economy to a level that is acceptable to merge to two Korean 
states.   
The importation of ideas and technology from the ROK can create a catalyst that 
can lead to economic growth followed by additional stability on the Korean peninsula.  
The use of “X” Year Economic plans, can introduce reforms on a rotational basis to 
modernize the current landscape of North Korea’s economy without the shock 
experienced by Germany during its rapid unification.  The ROK can use its own 
development path to encourage economic cooperation with outside nations that allowed 
them to grow while focusing on the success of the Korean led reforms during President 
Park’s tenure.     
The slow reduction of the DPRK’s Jueche philosophy is evident through the 
continual interaction with outside nations, particularly the ROK.  Its 1998 constitution 
demonstrates the desire of the DPRK to engage the international community on a basis 
where they are equals with foreign nations.  The ROK can filter managerial skills and 
techniques from the international community to the DPRK through SEZs while reducing 
the economic gap that has been increasing since the late eighties.191  The Jueche 
philosophy must continue to morph, removing the many years of distrust and propaganda 
about the outside world while introducing influences from outside nations.    
The education by observation utilized in the late fifties to reform the agricultural 
and industrial sectors should be revisited with instructors coming from South Korean 
companies to remain within the Jueche philosophy while stretching the philosophy’s 
borders.  These small interactions have the potential to span the entire spectrum of 
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business activity from the common worker to the highest levels of management.  These 
close interactions have the potential to increase trust and penetrate areas out side of the 
business world including politics. 
Similar to the South Korean restrictions on imported goods, another law can be 
instituted to allow the DPRK to maintain a local market for its own goods.  Restricting 
imports helps to increase the demand for local goods as citizens continue to buy the 
products made within the state’s borders.  A form of Jueche can be used to create national 
pride in locally produced goods, similar to the “Made in the U.S.A.” campaign of the 
eighties.  A slow influx of foreign made goods can help introduce citizens to new 
products but must be kept small as the isolated country becomes aware of the outside 
world and the products it produces.     
Recent activity has suggested the creation of informal capitalist markets forming 
by the citizens to fill the gap left by governmental policies.  Estimates in 2001 revealed 
nearly 300 of these free markets were operating and meet between 70-80% of the urban 
citizen’s needs.192  These markets should be targeted by outside nations to enlarge the 
policies within these markets to a larger scale expanding these principles to different 
areas of the nation, introducing these practices throughout North Korea. 
The above recommendations show an argument for economic engagement and 
how the ROK can use the history of the DPRK’s economy to ease the introduction of 
reforms into the isolated state of North Korea.  This path will reduce the economic gap 
between the two Koreas, create trust and provide an alternate path of income of North 
Korean leadership vice military sales, all vital for a foundation towards a smooth 
unification.  The divergent paths taken by each Korean state occurred over 50 years ago 
and we can expect the same length may be needed for the two states to diverge down a 
policy towards a single Korean nation.     
 
 
                                                 
192 Bradley Babson, “Mynmar and North Korea:  Informality in Asia’s Pariah States,” SAIS Review 




F.   CONCLUSION 
The path towards a unified Korean nation will not be easy or quick.  Even if an 
internal collapse of the DPRK occurred, it would take years before a nation emerges 
close to the current level of South Korea today.  The continued security threat throughout 
the Korean peninsula makes it important for the international community to start planning 
a vision where a permanent peace is evident.  While the three scenarios examined in this 
thesis are not perfect, they give an alternative to pursuing the status quo of two Korean 
states that only favors the political elite within North Korea.    
The uncertainty associated with the first two scenarios places them behind the 
expansion of SEZs.  The international community understands the potential problems 
associated with a collapse of the DPRK and hopes to choose an alternate method for 
unifying the peninsula, but should be ready to respond if a collapse occurs.  The potential 
of a FTA creates the possibility of stimulating economic growth within the DPRK but 
holds a high probability of failure without the proper oversight within the borders of 
North Korea as seen in the previous attempts to reform the DPRK economy.  Expansion 
of SEZs to places the power to shape the future of the Korean peninsula into the hands of 
the ROK continues to be the best scenario that meets the requirements of a unified nation 
without a nuclear arsenal that participates in the international community. 
The increased activity through economic assistance can allow the two Korean 
states to exchange ideas, people and technology while creating an atmosphere of trust 
desperately needed before unification plans can move forward.  The communication 
created by the KIC between the two governments can reach beyond basic economics and 
morph into talks about security and unification.  A main attraction and hope of the KIC 
for future intra-Korean affairs is its conception and creation by the two Korean states and 
the acceptance by the international community.  The continued expansion of the KIC 
along with the benefits it gives to each state holds the potential for a new era in intra-
Korea negotiations.   
The ROK can use its own model of development, including self-lead reforms, to 




parameters of the Jueche ideology.  The inclusion of SEZs in the 1998 Socialist 
Constitution of the DPRK allows the government to pursue this strategy without losing 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the DPRK citizens.  In the past, the DPRK SEZs have failed 
to draw enough foreign investment while being located in remote region of the state 
making logistics a nightmare.193  The initial investment needed to modernize the DPRK’s 
economy can come from the ROK as zones similar to the KIC are created allowing South 
Korean businesses to gain a comparative advantage over competitors in the world market.  
Focusing on South Korean assistance can slowly overcome the fear of accepting aid from 
the international community and allow the DPRK to build its economy. 
The theory of economic interdependence leads us to believe the threat of conflict 
can be minimized as both states pursue a common set of goals while their economies 
continue to be intertwined.  Their level of interdependence has been steadily growing 
economically and through continued communications showing the potential for future 
trade to continue.  The level of interdependence can eventually reach a culminating point 
where the future of each state focusing on the cooperation with its neighbor forcing both 
states to cooperate and formulate a common set of goals that can lead to unification.   
A continued thaw on the peninsula will demonstrate to foreign nations a North 
Korea that wishes to open its borders to the international community.  Talks need to 
continue between the two states as they advance their goals for the future.  The use of 
economics has added a variable previously absent in the Intra-Korean equation.  This 
includes a short period where aid temporarily stopped flowing north of the DMZ in 
response to aggressive behavior by the DPRK.  The hard line policies temporarily 
enacted by South Korea sends a message to the north stating the ability to continue to 
cooperate does not affect the ROK in the same manner as the DPRK.   
The acceptance of the DPRK government to welcome South Korean businesses 
inside its borders while expanding the KIC holds scenario three as the most practical 
while its creation garners international praise for cooperation between the two Korean 
states.  Economic engagement should continue as a new era of cooperation on the Korean 
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peninsula emerges while continuing to push the DPRK to remove the nuclear component 
of its military.  The potential of a leadership change within the DPRK within the next ten 
years can help swing the policies of the state towards more economic cooperation with 
the ROK similar to the transition of the PRC following Mao’s death.  These policies can 
be more conducive towards the goal of reunifying the nation.    
A unified Korean nation will still have to deal with numerous issues including the 
mistrust between two societies separated by years even after a slow unification process.  
The governmental elections must be favorable for all citizens within a unified Korea to 
give an air of transparency that allows the former DPRK citizens to believe in the 
governmental system and their elected officials.  Continued interactions between the two 
states show cooperation will help ease this transition and must continue after unification.   
The potential to station a temporary capital, possibly in Kaesong, will 
demonstrate a commitment to creating a new nation rather than simply absorbing the 
DPRK into the ROK.  This temporary capital, even if just an economic capital, can allow 
the citizens in the north to believe their interests are taken into consideration for future 
policies.  Using policies from past Korean dynasties who ruled a united Korean peninsula 
has the potential to increase the ease of unification and restore the nation’s prestige.   
The continued economic engagement by the ROK with a continued focus towards 
decreasing the economic gap while reforming the DPRK’s economy through a series of 
“x” year plans can create the conditions where both states wish to unify the Korean 
peninsula.  The process will be long and drawn-out, but having the two governments 
continue to keep lines of communication open while striving towards the same goals can 
help the Korean peninsula reach a single nation under one government that as been absent 
since the Yi Dynasty.  The path of economic engagement will encounter sets back and 
roadblocks that will have to be overcome in favor of the new nation.  The two Korean 
states appear to be headed down this path and must continue to expand their ties to set the 
conditions for unification within the lifespan of the newest citizens.       
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